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Abstract 
Does advice giving impact the advisor? While many studies have examined why it is 
helpful to receive advice, much less is known about what advisors gain when they give advice. 
Drawing on theories from adult development and social cognition, I propose that the act of 
advice giving can help advisors reason more wisely about a problem (by recognizing multiple 
perspectives, acknowledging a changing and uncertain world, having intellectual humility, 
seeking compromise, and using an outsider’s vantage point). To test this hypothesis, I utilized a 
multi-method approach. In Study 1, I examined 20 years of longitudinal data from over 3,000 
U.S. Americans and found that advice-giving tendencies predicted wise attitudes, such as the 
appreciation of different perspectives, openness to change, and intellectual humility. I then 
experimentally manipulated advice giving in Studies 2, 3, and 4, assessing how wisely people 
reasoned about interpersonal conflicts. In Study 2, reflections on situations in which people gave 
advice produced wiser reasoning compared to reflections on situations in which people dealt 
with a social issue on their own. In Studies 3 and 4, giving advice about a standardized scenario 
resulted in wiser reasoning compared to imagining the same scenario happening to them 
personally. Moreover, in Study 4 advice giving about one scenario also led to downstream 
effects for wiser reasoning in a subsequent, unrelated scenario. These studies shed light on the 
social and cognitive processes involved in advice giving. They also show how advice giving can 
be a way to cultivate greater wisdom in people’s lives. 
Keywords: Advice giving, wisdom, generativity, mentalization, psychological distance 
  
v 
 
Acknowledgements 
Completing this dissertation and doctoral degree would not have been possible without an 
extended family in Waterloo and around the globe. Firstly, I thank my parents for giving me the 
freedom to move countries and pursue the career I wanted. Even if they live halfway across the 
world, they are constant cheerleaders for my work and make me feel supported and loved no 
matter what happens in my life. 
I also thank my supervisor, Igor, for the push and guidance he has provided over the past 
five years. I am also grateful for the Psychology faculty and staff at the University of Waterloo 
and at Renison, who have been open, friendly, and willing to hustle to help me make it through 
the rough spots in my graduate career.  
I developed a kind and collegial view of academia thanks to the graduate students from 
the Social Area (and Psychology in general). They created a lively and supportive community, 
and many doors were always open for random laughs or a question about statistics. Special 
mention goes to my Big Sib, Jane, with whom I shared many long talks about philosophy and 
arguments about the theories we were developing. Moreover, while I only overlapped with 
Courtney and Crystal for one or two years, they have always been a source of sage advice 
through the years. I also largely credit my knowledge of R and advanced statistics to Jeff, who 
always had his door open for me regardless of how many questions I had. Finally, special thanks 
to Alex and Crystal, who have contributed to the design of these studies in its earliest iterations. 
A special thank you to Iris, who feels like a long-time confidant and collaborator, even if 
we have not published anything together (yet). In addition, I am always grateful to Yulia, who 
started me on the path as a psychological scientist and believed in me during the many times I 
struggled to believe in myself. 
Much of my work would not have been completed with the many research assistants who 
have assisted me on various projects throughout the years. In particular, I am particularly 
indebted to former lab managers, Jackie and Sonia, for their hard work, ideas, and friendship. I 
am rooting for both of their careers in graduate school and cannot wait for their stars to shine 
brighter than mine. 
Finally, I do not think I would have made it through graduate school if not for the dance 
community at the Hepcat Studio (as well as friends from other dance scenes). The social dances 
provided a softer place to land and playing with the Hep Cat Swing Band gave me an excuse to 
leave work (relatively early) on Thursdays. I am also fortunate to have met so many PhD’s in 
this community – Sandy, Nicole, Jessica, Kevin, Margot, Kirsten, and Gloria – with whom I 
have brainstormed ideas, discussed how to navigate academia, and shared many enjoyable 
dances.
vi 
 
Table of Contents 
List of Figures .......................................................................................................................................... viii 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................. ix 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1 
Advice Giving and Wisdom ...................................................................................................................... 2 
The Characteristics and Benefits of Advice Giving .................................................................................. 3 
Prior Theories about Wisdom ................................................................................................................... 5 
Defining Wise Reasoning ......................................................................................................................... 7 
Developmental Theories about Advice Giving and Wisdom ................................................................... 8 
A Socio-cognitive Account of Advice Giving and Wisdom ..................................................................... 9 
Facilitating Wiser Reasoning through Advice Giving ............................................................................ 12 
Overview of the Present Studies ............................................................................................................. 13 
CHAPTER 2: ADVICE-GIVING TENDENCIES AND WISDOM-RELATED ATTITUDES ACROSS 
TWENTY YEARS OF LONGITUDINAL DATA .................................................................................... 15 
Study 1 .................................................................................................................................................... 15 
Method ................................................................................................................................................ 15 
Results ................................................................................................................................................. 19 
Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 3: WISE REASONING IN RECALLED ADVICE-GIVING SITUATIONS ........................ 23 
Study 2 .................................................................................................................................................... 23 
Method ................................................................................................................................................ 24 
Results ................................................................................................................................................. 27 
Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 30 
CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF ADVICE GIVING ON WISE REASONING ABOUT 
STANDARDIZED DILEMMAS ............................................................................................................... 31 
Study 3 .................................................................................................................................................... 31 
Method ................................................................................................................................................ 31 
Results ................................................................................................................................................. 33 
Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 35 
CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF ADVICE GIVING ON WISE REASONING ABOUT AN 
UNRELATED DILEMMA ........................................................................................................................ 36 
Study 4 .................................................................................................................................................... 36 
Method ................................................................................................................................................ 37 
Results ................................................................................................................................................. 39 
vii 
 
Discussion ........................................................................................................................................... 42 
CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION .................................................................................................. 45 
Potential Psychological Mechanisms ...................................................................................................... 46 
Unanswered Questions ............................................................................................................................ 49 
Implications............................................................................................................................................. 52 
Limitations and Future Directions .......................................................................................................... 54 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 57 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................... 59 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................................ 70 
Appendix A: Supplementary Analyses for Study 1 ................................................................................ 70 
Testing the Models without Low Loading Items ................................................................................ 70 
Appendix B: Wise Reasoning Items for Studies 2, 3, and 4 ................................................................... 72 
Appendix C: Supplementary Analyses for Study 2 ................................................................................ 73 
Controlling for Time Passed ............................................................................................................... 73 
Appendix D: Materials for Study 3 ......................................................................................................... 76 
Newspaper Advice Column ................................................................................................................ 76 
Appendix E: Materials for Study 4 ......................................................................................................... 77 
Newspaper Advice Column 1 ............................................................................................................. 77 
Newspaper Advice Column 2 ............................................................................................................. 77 
Unrelated Dilemma 1 .......................................................................................................................... 78 
Unrelated Dilemma 2 .......................................................................................................................... 78 
 
  
viii 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Path diagrams for the cross-lagged panel ...................................................................... 18 
Figure 2. Cross-lagged panel model of advice-giving tendencies and wisdom-related attitudes 
across three time points (T1, T2, and T3) ..................................................................................... 21 
Figure 4. Bar chart of the effect of advice condition on the wise reasoning composite score 
(Study 2)........................................................................................................................................ 28 
Figure 5. Bar chart of the effect of advice condition on the wise reasoning composite score 
(Study 3)........................................................................................................................................ 34 
Figure 6. Bar chart of the effect of condition on the initial dilemma wise reasoning dimensions 
....................................................................................................................................................... 40 
Figure 7. Bar chart of the effect of condition on the unrelated dilemma wise reasoning 
dimensions. ................................................................................................................................... 41 
Figure 8. Cross-lagged panel model of advice-giving tendencies and wisdom-related attitudes 
across three time points (T1, T2, and T3) without low-loading items .......................................... 71 
Figure 10. Bar chart of the effect of advice condition on the wise reasoning composite score 
(residuals). ..................................................................................................................................... 74 
  
ix 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Demographic Information for Studies 1-4. ..................................................................... 16 
Table 2. Factor Loadings for Latent Variables ............................................................................. 19 
Table 4. Means and Confidence Intervals for the Effect of Condition on Wise Reasoning 
Dimensions (Study 2) ................................................................................................................... 29 
Table 5. Means and Confidence Intervals for the Effect of Condition on Wise Reasoning 
Dimensions (Study 3) ................................................................................................................... 35 
Table 6. Advice Giving  Initial Dilemma  Unrelated Dilemma Mediation Model ............... 42 
Table 7. Means and Confidence Intervals for the Effect of Condition on Wise Reasoning 
Dimensions (Residuals) ................................................................................................................ 75 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
“This is ‘Ask a Grown Man,’ and we are going to try to answer your questions to the best of our 
abilities – although being grown is debatable.” – Hip hop duo Run the Jewels (2015) in an advice 
video for Rookiemag.com 
 What happens when people are asked to give advice? The above quotation comes from a 
series of advice videos in an online teen magazine, where celebrities received questions from 
teenagers and tried to give them advice. The celebrities were not trained to give advice in this 
context, and a number of them admitted that they did not consider themselves to be particularly 
wise. However, many of these advisors took the task seriously and gave insightful 
recommendations. This kind of scenario demonstrates how people can react when asked to give 
advice. For instance, the people in the above example showed intellectual humility by admitting 
how they might not be experts in life matters.   
Advice-giving situations are not limited to online magazines or newspaper columns, as 
parents, friends, teachers, or supervisors could be called to give advice regardless of their 
background. Advice is an important part of everyday life, because few decisions are made 
completely alone (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). More broadly, sharing information with others is a 
key process involved in social learning and in passing on cultural information from one 
generation to the next (Schönpflug, 2001; Schotter & Sopher, 2003). While past research has 
examined what knowledge, skills, and abilities make a good advisor (e.g., Bonaccio & Dalal, 
2006; Dakof & Taylor, 1990; Jungermann & Fischer, 2005), an overlooked possibility is that 
giving advice could also benefit the advisor. In my dissertation, I consider this possibility and 
specifically focus on whether advice giving promotes greater wisdom for the advisor in 
reflections on challenging interpersonal issues.  
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Advice Giving and Wisdom 
 In classical texts, the archetype of wisdom often appears in the form of an advisor. For 
instance, Herodotus’ accounts of Ancient Greek history often includes advisors, who bring 
success to leaders that listen to their recommendations (Lattimore, 1939). The Biblical King 
Solomon writes that taking the advice of others leads to wisdom (e.g., Proverbs 12:15; 13:10; 
19:20). And in East Asia, the Confucian scholar Xunzi specifies that advisors should know what 
moral behavior is and how to apply it in a given situation (Tiwald, 2012; Xunzi, 2.13; 8.11). 
These texts suggest taking advice leads to successful outcomes and that good advice giving 
involves wisdom.  
Contemporary scholars have also linked wisdom and advice giving. Looking first at the 
philosophy of science, Maxwell (1984) proposes that simply generating and sharing knowledge 
is not enough to be a good scientist. People need to use knowledge in the service of wise goals, 
which are to promote human well-being and to help people find values in their lives. Tiberius 
(2008, 2016) argues that wise people make good advisors, as they are more aware of their 
epistemic limits. They make recommendations that are more accurate because they can comment 
on what they know and be more cautious on subjects about which they have less information. A 
number of social and developmental psychologists also share this view, as they hold that wisdom 
includes good judgement and the ability to give insightful counsel (Kramer, 1983, 2000; C. 
Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). These academic perspectives dovetail 
with the lay belief that wise people can be identified by their ability to give useful advice (Bluck 
& Glück, 2005; Glück, Bluck, Baron, & McAdams, 2005). Given these beliefs, people tend to 
evaluate advisors based on their general wisdom and expertise in life (Feng & MacGeorge, 
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2010). For example, people consider mentors and doctors to be wise when they give sound 
recommendations (Branch & Mitchell, 2011; Sosik & Lee, 2002).  
Taken together, cultural narratives and recent scholarship suggest that advice giving and 
wisdom may be intimately linked. According to these sources, wise individuals would make 
good advisors. At the same time, it is also possible that advice giving can promote greater 
wisdom for the advisor. The path from advice giving to wisdom is particularly interesting, as few 
researchers have examined the cognitive benefits of advice giving for advisors (Allen, 2007). In 
addition, understanding the outcomes of advice giving can provide a way for people to achieve 
greater wisdom in their lives. In the following sections, I will describe how I conceptualize 
advice giving and summarize how psychologists have studied it. Next, I will give an overview of 
the psychological investigation of wisdom. I will then build on developmental and socio-
cognitive theories to explore whether and how advice giving might facilitate greater wisdom. 
Finally, I will describe the aims of the current investigation and the studies that I conducted. 
The Characteristics and Benefits of Advice Giving 
Advice is any idea, judgement, or recommendation that a person (the advisor) offers to 
someone else (the recipient1) to help them understand a situation and/or make a decision 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). 
Advisors provide information that the recipient lacks, and this can come in the form of expertise 
in a topic (Jungermann & Fischer, 2005) or simply by having a different perspective (Harvey, 
Harries, & Fischer, 2000; Yaniv, 2004). Advice mainly provides recipients with additional 
information or a new way to think about a problem (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). In addition, 
advisors can also provide emotional support, such as sympathy and encouragement (Goldsmith 
                                                          
1 Recipients are also called “judges” in research that focuses on how people evaluate the advice that is given to them 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Sniezek & Buckley, 1995). 
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& Fitch, 1997; Horowitz et al., 2006; Schlosser & Gelso, 2001; Whittemore, Rankin, Callahan, 
Leder, & Carroll, 2000). 
Prior literature on advice giving has primarily focused on the recipients. A large body of 
work has examined the factors that help or hinder recipients from accepting advice when it is 
available (e.g., Budescu & Rantilla, 2000; Dalal & Bonaccio, 2010; Gino & Schweitzer, 2008; 
Harvey et al., 2000; Sah, Loewenstein, & Cain, 2013; Yaniv, 2004). For instance, one cue that 
influences the acceptance or rejection of advice is the advisor’s credibility and prior knowledge 
on the subject (Jungermann & Fischer, 2005). Accepting advice is often beneficial for the 
recipient, as the advice provides new information and alternative solutions for a given dilemma 
(Heath & Gonzalez, 1995). It also increases the accuracy of people’s predictions and decisions 
(Gardner & Berry, 1995; Gilbert, Killingsworth, Eyre, & Wilson, 2009; Sniezek, Schrah, & 
Dalal, 2004; for a review, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). In addition, actively seeking advice 
brings reputational benefits, as advisors are more likely to view people who seek advice as 
competent (Brooks, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2015). In sum, advice often benefits the recipients.  
In contrast, only a few studies have examined the benefits of advice giving for the advisor 
(Allen, 2007). Some of these studies have focused on mentorship, which involves advice giving. 
This work has identified some emotional and reputational benefits for the mentor, such as 
personal satisfaction (e.g., Allen, Poteet, & Burroughs, 1997; Kram, 1985; Mullen & Noe, 1999; 
Ragins & Scandura, 1999), increased commitment to the organization (Eby, Durley, Evans, & 
Ragins, 2006), and career success (Allen, Day, & Lentz, 2005; Bozionelos, 2004). Other research 
has examined the cognitive benefits of advice giving by noting differences in how advisors 
process information relative to someone making a decision alone (personal decision-makers). In 
particular, when deliberating about a problem, advisors consider more factors that would 
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influence a decision compared to personal decision-makers (Jonas & Frey, 2003; Jonas, Schulz-
Hardt, & Frey, 2005; Kray, 2000). For instance, Jonas and colleagues (2005) asked participants 
to either give advice to another person, make a decision for themselves, or decide for another 
person (which was comparable to making a personal decision) about what lottery prize to take 
home. After they or the person they were advising made a preliminary selection, the participants 
were presented with a list of arguments for or against those prizes. Those who gave advice were 
more likely than those in other conditions to conduct a balanced search for information by 
looking for arguments both for and against the prizes (Jonas et al., 2005). The few studies that 
have focused on the advisor suggest that they consider more information compared to personal 
decision-makers. However, it is unclear whether advice giving has any effects on other forms of 
reasoning, including those that are central to the psychological features of wisdom.  
Prior Theories about Wisdom 
Many philosophers and behavioral scientists have considered wisdom to be the pinnacle 
of human development and reasoning. Although scholars have long written about wisdom, only 
recently have they begun to formally define and measure it. Erikson (1950) describes wisdom as 
personal maturation in old age that comes from successfully managing the conflict between 
despair (i.e., regret about past mistakes and missed opportunities) and integrity (i.e., satisfaction 
with one’s life). Specifically, he observed that people who achieve wisdom in old age are able to 
reflect on their past experiences and appreciate them (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1987). 
Tiberius (2008, 2016) also believes that wisdom involves self-reflection, and sees this process as 
unfolding throughout one’s life, ultimately paying off in old age. If people are constantly able to 
reflect on their actions, they will be able to act in ways that balance competing goals. Later in 
life, one can look back and be satisfied with one’s past decisions. 
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Neo-Piagetian scholars have also approached wisdom as an advanced stage of human 
development. However, they see wisdom as a way of thinking about moral decisions. According 
to the classic Piagetian perspective, individuals nearing the end of childhood learn how to 
understand abstract but fixed rules that allow them to successfully interact with the world (Piaget 
& Inhelder, 1969). However, many social situations are ill-defined in that they are influenced by 
multiple factors and cannot be easily reduced to a few universal rules or solutions (Kelley, 1979; 
Murray & Holmes, 2009; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Santos, Huynh, & Grossmann, 2017; Schraw, 
Dunkle, & Bendixen, 1995). To illustrate this distinction, compare the task of comprehending the 
rules dictating which car moves first at an intersection and the task of figuring out how to reduce 
traffic jams at a specific intersection. The first task only requires an understanding of a few 
principles regarding traffic lights and the right of way. The second task, representing an ill-
defined problem, involves discovering the social and environmental causes for traffic jams at that 
particular intersection and creating solutions that can successfully address them.  
To address such ill-defined problems, Neo-Piagetians propose a reduced reliance on 
formal rules (e.g., Kitchener, 1983; Kramer, 1983; Labouvie-Vief & Blanchard-Fields, 1982). 
Instead, people should develop a pragmatic appreciation for the context, making decisions that 
are suited to a given situation. For instance, Basseches (1984) proposes that in the latter stages of 
development, adults develop dialectical reasoning. Individuals who think dialectically recognize 
that moral principles are important, but the specifics can vary, depending on the context. As a 
result, they scrutinize the situation closely and creatively find ways to make a decision that suits 
their particular circumstances. Another perspective, which draws from a modern interpretation of 
Aristotelian philosophy, agrees with this focus on the context. Scholars from this school of 
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thought focus on phronesis – practical wisdom – which emphasizes focusing on real-world 
situations as opposed to idealized principles (Kekes, 1995; Schwartz & Sharpe, 2006).  
Defining Wise Reasoning 
In characterizing wisdom, both Eriksonian and Neo-Piagetian schools of thought describe 
processes such as transcending one’s present perspective (to think about past or alternate 
viewpoints), addressing uncertainties in life, and seeking balance between different goals. 
Building on these early descriptions, psychologists have recently defined wisdom as a pragmatic 
set of reasoning strategies that helps people manage social dilemmas2 (wise reasoning from here; 
for reviews, see Baltes & Smith, 2008; Grossmann, 2017; Staudinger & Glück, 2011). These 
forms of reasoning include (a) understanding the limits of one’s knowledge, (b) acknowledging 
that the world is uncertain and changing, (c) recognizing multiple perspectives and a broader 
context, and (d) searching for compromise and the integration of different ideas (Grossmann, 
2017). Although this definition of wise reasoning largely draws from intellectual traditions in 
Western Europe and North America, similar themes have also been found in Hinduism, 
Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism (Grossmann & Kung, in press). Notably, wise reasoning 
does not provide the actual solution for the problem, nor does it describe what a successful 
outcome should look like. Rather, it provides tools that allow people to pragmatically approach 
the situation (Santos et al., 2017). 
Wise reasoning is related to a number of positive traits, such as greater agreeableness and 
openness (Brienza, Kung, Santos, Bobocel, & Grossmann, 2017; Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003; 
Levenson, Jennings, Aldwin, & Shirashi, 2005; Mickler & Staudinger, 2008; Wink & 
                                                          
2 Other definitions include constructs like expert knowledge, emotional control, self-insight, and prosociality 
(Bangen et al., 2013; Staudinger & Glück, 2011; Sternberg, 1998; Walsh, 2015). By focusing on wise reasoning, I 
pay close attention to how people make sense of the situations or problems that they are facing. 
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Staudinger, 2016)3. It is also associated with less depressive rumination (Brienza et al., 2017). 
Looking at interpersonal outcomes, wise reasoning also promotes greater cooperation and the 
endorsement of conflict resolution behaviors like forgiveness (Brienza et al., 2017; Grossmann, 
Brienza, & Bobocel, 2017). Concerning discriminant validity, wise reasoning has a unique 
network of relationships with outcomes and dispositional traits that is not fully covered by other 
personality constructs. For instance, wise reasoning – but not intelligence – is associated with 
markers of well-being such as life satisfaction, subjective relationship quality, and longevity 
(Grossmann, Na, Varnum, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2013; for a broader discussion of such 
relationships, see Brienza et al., 2017).  
Developmental Theories about Advice Giving and Wisdom 
Looking across the lifespan, developmental psychologists from the Eriksonian tradition 
have proposed that guiding the next generation through behavior like advice giving leads to 
wisdom. According to Erikson’s (1950) stages of psychosocial development, middle-aged adults 
face the conflict of stagnation vs. generativity (McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993; 
McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; McAdams, 2006). In other words, this conflict involves 
deciding whether to focus on self-indulgence or on guiding the next generation. Successfully 
addressing this conflict by becoming more generative precedes the development of wisdom in 
older age (Erikson et al., 1987). Although generativity often involves parenting, it can also refer 
to teaching and mentoring others (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; Slater, 2003). Taken 
together, Erikson’s model of human development suggests that advising others can lead to 
greater wisdom. 
                                                          
3 The latter four references did not use measures of wise reasoning per se, but instead used dispositional measures of 
wisdom that followed similar conceptual definitions. 
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A large body of research has examined the theory, phenomenology, and correlates of 
generativity, and much of this work suggests that generativity leads to wisdom (e.g., Cheng, 
2009; Grossbaum & Bates, 2002; Hofer, Busch, Chasiotis, Kärtner, & Campos, 2008; McAdams 
& de St. Aubin, 1992; B. E. Peterson & Stewart, 1996). For instance, a common narrative for 
generative Americans involves a redemptive arc, where people face conflicts between agentic 
and communal goals, but in the end, stick to their moral values and promote future growth in the 
next generation (McAdams, 2006). This kind of story allows people to reflect on how they have 
balanced different concerns in life and take stock of how they have changed and grown over 
time. In support of this account, a few studies found a positive association between self-reported 
measures of generativity and psychological well-being, which includes wisdom-related items on 
personal growth (An & Cooney, 2006; Keyes & Ryff, 1998; Rothrauff & Cooney, 2008). 
However, these studies only looked at cross-sectional correlations between generativity and 
wisdom-related characteristics. They did not examine whether generativity led to greater wisdom 
over time (through either longitudinal analysis or experimental manipulation). As such, the 
causal relationship between advice giving and wisdom is still an open question. 
A Socio-cognitive Account of Advice Giving and Wisdom 
According to Erikson’s theory of development, wisdom is a quality that is largely 
achieved at the end of life, in part, through advice giving. Looking more closely at what happens 
when people give advice, research from social and cognitive psychology suggests that the act of 
advice giving can facilitate mental processes associated with wisdom. These studies suggest that 
independent of one’s stage in life, people can become wiser in a given situation by giving advice 
to someone else. 
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One explanation for the potential effect of advice giving on wise reasoning is that 
advisors are more likely than personal decision-makers to consider another person’s mental 
processes, including their feelings, needs, and goals (mentalizing from here; Epley & Waytz, 
2010; Fonagy, Bateman, & Bateman, 2011; Liljenfors & Lundh, 2015). Compared to reflecting 
about a problem alone, advising involves interacting with another person, the recipient. In 
particular, advisors try to consider what the recipient is going through and what kind of solution 
they might want (Kray, 2000). Considering other people’s mental processes is a key component 
of wise reasoning (Grossmann, 2017), so people might reason more wisely when in the presence 
of other people. In support of this idea, Staudinger and Baltes (1996) found that people reasoned 
more wisely about a dilemma when they were prompted to consider what another person would 
think about their response. In addition, Grossmann, Gerlach, and Denissen (2016) found in a 
daily diary study that people reported greater intellectual humility and reduced focus on the self 
when they were with other people (vs. being alone). In sum, giving advice could involve 
mentalization processes that facilitate wiser reasoning.  
Aside from thinking about other people, advisors are called to think about someone else’s 
problem, which means that advisors (vs. personal decision-makers) are more psychologically 
distant from the problem (Danziger, Montal, & Barkan, 2012). As a result, advisors tend to think 
about problem more abstractly – that is, they focus on the central features of the problem and 
ignore specific, idiosyncratic information (Trope & Liberman, 2010). In support of this idea, 
Jungermann & Fischer (2005) observe that advisors tend to know less about the specific details 
of the problem compared to the recipient. In addition, simply learning about another person’s 
problem or figuring out how to solve it could facilitate abstract thought. Compared to learning 
based on one’s personal experiences, learning from other people promotes more abstract thinking 
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(Kalkstein, Kleiman, Wakslak, Liberman, & Trope, 2016). Because wise reasoning involves 
paying attention to the broader context (Grossmann, 2017), the abstraction involved in advice 
giving could facilitate wiser reasoning among advisors. 
Related research on explanation – which is involved in advice giving – also suggests that 
explaining a concept to someone else encourages abstract thinking (Lombrozo, 2006). By 
viewing an issue broadly, an explainer can then develop a parsimonious explanation that can 
apply to other similar cases (Blanchard, Vasilyeva, & Lombrozo, 2017). In addition, the act of 
explanation can induce intellectual humility, as it reduces one’s overconfidence in how well they 
know a given topic (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). For instance, in a series of experiments, Fernbach, 
Rogers, Fox, & Sloman (2013), asked participants to explain political issues that they felt 
strongly about. Compared to people who merely enumerated the reasons they supported these 
policies, those who explained the nature of these issues rated themselves as less knowledgeable 
on the topic. They also adopted more moderate attitudes towards that particular policy, which 
shows balance – one of the key aims of wisdom (Baltes & Smith, 2008; Brienza et al., 2017; 
Sternberg, 1998). Advisors are likely to explain their recommendations to a recipient, and in 
turn, may become more abstract and intellectually humble thinkers. 
Advice giving typically involves considering the mental processes of others, being 
psychologically distant from a problem, and explaining a concept to someone else – all factors 
that may reduce focus on one’s self (self-distancing; for a review, see Kross & Ayduk, 2011). 
Recent experimental work suggests that various methods of self-distancing can increase wise 
reasoning about a given social dilemma (Grossmann, 2017). For example, when undergraduate 
students thought about the difficult job market after graduation, they were able to reflect more 
wisely on their situation (e.g., by being intellectually humble and open to the possibility of 
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change) when they viewed the situation as a distant observer rather than through their own eyes 
(Kross & Grossmann, 2012). Similar manipulations that have facilitated wiser reasoning about 
social problems include thinking about the future self instead of the present self (Huynh, Yang, 
& Grossmann, 2016) and using third-person language (e.g., third-person pronouns he, she, his, or 
her) when referring to one’s self (Grossmann & Kross, 2014). Overall, these studies suggest that 
self-distancing behaviors – like advice giving – can be a path to wiser reasoning. 
Facilitating Wiser Reasoning through Advice Giving 
 The socio-cognitive account of the relationship between advice giving and wisdom 
dovetail with recent theorizing that suggests that wisdom is malleable and influenced by the 
situation (Santos et al., 2017). For instance, an individual’s wise reasoning varies from day to 
day (Brienza et al., 2017; Glück et al., 2015; Grossmann et al., 2016). This variation is 
systematic, and one factor that influences wise reasoning is the self-relevance of a given 
situation. For instance, Grossmann and Kross (2014) found in three experiments that people 
tended to reason more wisely about conflicts that did not involve themselves personally. In these 
studies, participants were asked to imagine a hypothetical situation where their partner (self-
relevant condition) or their friend’s partner (other-relevant condition) was being unfaithful. 
Participants reasoned more wisely when thinking about a friend’s conflict. In addition, people 
from cultures and social classes that put a greater emphasis on social contexts vs. the self are 
more likely to reason wisely about interpersonal conflicts (Brienza & Grossmann, 2017; 
Grossmann et al., 2012). These studies suggest that focusing on other people instead of the self 
increases wise reasoning. 
Given the malleability of wise reasoning, I propose that advice giving can be another 
method to facilitate wiser reasoning. This idea brings together developmental theories about the 
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role of advice giving in the development of wisdom (e.g., Erikson et al., 1987; McAdams, 2006) 
with research on the socio-cognitive processes involved when giving advice (e.g., Danziger et 
al., 2012; Kross & Grossmann, 2012; Lombrozo, 2006; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). I aim to 
provide longitudinal and experimental evidence for the effect of advice giving on wisdom and 
increase the tools that people can use to increase wise reasoning in everyday life. In addition, I 
aim to contrast advice giving against two related processes: mentalization and psychological 
distance. Prior literature suggests that these two processes play a role in advice giving (Danziger 
et al., 2012; Kray, 2000), but I plan to test whether advice giving has unique effects on wise 
reasoning. 
Overview of the Present Studies 
In the present research, I investigated the effect of advice giving on the advisor’s wise 
reasoning. In Study 1, I examined the cross-sectional and longitudinal relationship between 
advice-giving tendencies and wisdom-related characteristics in a national sample of U.S. 
Americans across 20 years. In Study 2, I looked at how people reason about specific situations 
and test whether recalling past dilemmas involving advice giving leads to wiser reasoning about 
that dilemma, compared to facing the dilemma alone, hearing advice being given to someone 
else, or receiving advice. In Study 3, I asked participants to read a standardized conflict and 
either give advice on it, imagine it is happening to a friend (without giving advice), or imagine 
that they are facing it personally. Finally, in Study 4, I tested whether advice giving (vs. facing a 
personal dilemma) in one situation led to wiser reasoning about a separate, unrelated conflict. 
Across these four studies, I examined the effects of advice giving in everyday life and in 
controlled, experimental settings. I also explored some potential mechanisms that could explain 
how advice giving contributes to wiser reasoning. 
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I performed all analyses using the R language for statistical computing (R Core Team, 
2018). Reproducible code and data for all studies and preregistrations for Studies 2, 3, and 4 are 
available at https://osf.io/8qnqg/.  
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CHAPTER 2: ADVICE-GIVING TENDENCIES AND WISDOM-RELATED ATTITUDES 
ACROSS TWENTY YEARS OF LONGITUDINAL DATA 
Study 1 
I first examined whether advice giving would affect wisdom-related characteristics 
throughout the life course. To this end, I analyzed data from a national, longitudinal study of 
U.S. Americans with three waves collected across twenty years. As this study did not include 
explicit, state-based measures of wise reasoning, I examined pragmatic attitudes to life matters 
that include the acknowledgement of intellectual humility in one’s viewpoints, recognition of the 
varied contexts of life and how they change over time, and open-mindedness toward different 
viewpoints on a challenging issue. These attitudes map onto some common definitions of 
wisdom (Bangen, Meeks, & Jeste, 2013; Grossmann, 2017; Staudinger & Glück, 2011). First 
looking at cross-sectional relationships, I predicted that people who tend to give advice will also 
report greater wisdom-related attitudes. In addition, I predicted that advice giving will predict 
greater wisdom-related attitudes over time. 
Method 
 Participants. I analyzed data from a set of longitudinal studies of health and well-being –
Midlife in the United States (MIDUS; Brim et al., 1999; Ryff et al., 2007, 2015). This study 
surveyed 7,108 participants at three time points: Time 1 (1995-1996), Time 2 (2005-2006), and 
Time 3 (2013-2014). Of these participants, 3,294 completed the measures at all three time points. 
After excluding participants who did not respond to any of the advice-giving and wisdom-related 
items, the final sample was 3,243. Table 1 shows the demographic information for the included 
participants. 
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Table 1. Demographic Information for Studies 1-4. 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Mean age 45.69 37.95 37.38 38.80 
Sex (%)     
     Male 44.60 30.20 34.90 36.20 
     Female 55.00 69.20 64.90 63.60 
     Other/Did not respond 0.40 0.60 0.20 0.20 
Ethnicity (%)     
     African American/Canadian 3.40 7.50 9.10 9.40 
     Asian American/Canadian 0.50 3.90 4.10 4.50 
     European American/Canadian 93.70 80.20 76.70 75.60 
     Latino American/Canadian -- 5.00 5.50 5.60 
     Native/Aboriginal 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.50 
     Other 0.20 3.40 3.80 4.50 
Educational attainment (%)     
     Less than high school 5.20 0.20 0.50 0.20 
     High school diploma or GED 30.40 7.00 7.20 8.90 
     Some college / vocational degree 24.90 35.00 41.20 36.10 
     4-year college degree 25.50 40.40 37.80 40.30 
     Graduate or professional degree 14.00 17.40 13.30 14.50 
Median household income $50,001-
75,000 
$50,001-
75,000 
$35,001-
50,000 
$50,001-
75,000 
Sample size 3,243 536 416 630 
Note: Study 1 did not have any categories for Latino American participants. In Study 2, 
participants were asked to indicate gender instead of sex. 
 
Measures. All items were drawn from the MIDUS surveys (Brim et al., 1999; Ryff et al., 
2007, 2015). 
Advice-giving tendencies (Advice Giving). The surveys included 3 questions tapping into 
the tendency people give advice to others: a) “You like to teach things to people;” b) “Many 
people come to you for advice;” and c) “How often do any friends, relatives, or coworkers turn 
to you for advice or help with a personal or practical problem they have?” The first two items 
were scored on a four point scale (from 1 = Not at all to 4 = A lot), and the third item was scored 
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on a six point scale (from 1 = Never to 6 = More than a couple of times a week). The three 
variables were correlated to each other at each wave (rs = .23 - .48)4. 
Wisdom-related attitudes (Wise Attitudes). The surveys included three questions tapping 
into wisdom-related attitudes about life experiences: a) “I think it is important to have new 
experiences that challenge how I think about myself and the world” [intellectual humility]; b) 
“Life has been a continuous process of learning, changing, and growth” [recognition of world in 
flux/change] (1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree); c) “In a bad situation it helps to find a 
different way of looking at things” [recognition of multiple perspectives] (1 = Not at all to 4 = A 
lot). The three variables were correlated to each other at each wave (rs = .21 - .55). 
Analytic Procedure. I constructed structural equation models (SEM) using the lavaan 
package in R (Rosseel, 2017). Specifically, I set up a cross-lagged panel model, which explores 
the relationship between two constructs and how they affect each other over time by examining 
the cross-lagged path (e.g., the effect of XTime1 on YTime2; for a review, see Selig & Little, 2012). 
The cross-lagged panel model controls for stability over time by including the autoregressive 
path, which is the effect of the construct on itself at the next time point (e.g., the effect of YTime1 
on YTime2). Notably, the autoregressive path represents rank-order stability, where a positive 
autoregressive effect for a given construct means that an individual’s rank in the sample will 
remain the same over time. As a result, the cross-lagged path represents the effect of XTime1 on 
YTime2 over and above the effect of YTime1. In addition, this model rules out the possibility that the 
correlation between XTime1 and YTime1 explained any of the cross-lagged paths to Time 2.  
                                                          
4 As alphas are affected by very low number of items (Cortina, 1993), I reported inter-item correlations here as there 
were only three items for each construct. 
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Figure 1. Path diagrams for the cross-lagged panel. Circles represent latent variables. The 
straight arrows represent regression paths and the curved arrows represent correlations between 
the residuals of the latent variables. 
Figure 1 shows the cross-lagged panel model without the indicator variables and error 
terms. At each time point, I set advice giving and wise attitudes as latent variables consisting of 
three items each. To control for the stability of the variables over time, I allowed Time 1 latent 
variables to predict their Time 2 counterparts, and Time 2 variables to predict their Time 3 
counterparts. In addition, I allowed the latent variables to co-vary at each time point to examine 
the cross-sectional correlation between advice-giving tendencies and wisdom-related attitudes. 
Finally, I allowed the error term of each variable to co-vary with its counterpart in different time 
points to account for the measurement of the same item across different years5. 
Following recommendations by Enders and Bandalos (2001), I used full information 
maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation to deal with missing data. To evaluate both models, I 
                                                          
5 It is possible that the cross-lagged panel model does not capture a stable trait-like component underlying the 
constructs over time (Hamaker, Kuiper, & Grasman, 2015; Hertzog & Nesselroade, 2012). I tested for this 
possibility by adding autoregressive and cross-lagged paths from the Time 1 to the Time 3 latent variables. If T1 
variables had a significant effect on T3 variables over and above the effects of T2 variables, then there might be a 
stable component to consider. The cross-lagged paths had negligible effects, which suggests that an effect between 
stable components of the constructs is unlikely, Wise Attitudes  Advice Giving: B = -0.01, SE = 0.08, p = .73; 
Advice Giving  Wise Attitudes: B = 0.14, SE = 0.08, p = .06. 
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followed established guidelines for good model fit: RMSEA < .08, PCLOSE > .05, and CFI > 
.95 (Meyers, Gamst, & Guarino, 2006). 
Results 
 This model had good fit, RMSEA = .029, PCLOSE > .999, CFI = .980. In addition, the 
advice-giving items and the wisdom-related items loaded onto their respective latent constructs6 
(see Table 2). 
Table 2. Factor Loadings for Latent Variables 
Indicator Item 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 
B (SE) β B (SE) β B (SE) β 
Advice-giving Tendencies       
     Teaching to others  -- .61 -- .60 -- .63 
     Many come to you for advice  1.31 (0.06) .77 1.31 (0.06) .77 1.19 (0.05) .75 
     Friends/relatives asked for advice 1.33 (0.07) .48 1.27 (0.07) .47 1.07 (0.06) .46 
Wisdom-related Attitudes       
     Intellectual humility  -- .71 -- .50 -- .52 
     World in flux and change 1.05 (0.04) .76 1.06 (0.06) .58 1.03 (0.06) .61 
     Diff. perspectives 0.44 (0.02) .45 0.50 (0.03) .45 0.49 (0.03) .45 
Note: B (SE) – unstandardized factor loadings and standard errors;  
β – standardized factor loadings. T1 – Time 1; T2 – Time 2; T3 – Time 3.  
 
First, I examined the cross-sectional relationships between advice giving and wise 
attitudes. I found that participants reporting a greater tendency to give advice also reported wiser 
attitudes at each time point, rtime1 = .46, rtime2 = .33, rtime3 = .37. Next, I tested whether these 
coefficients were significantly different from each other. I did this by constraining the 
covariation paths between advice giving and wise attitudes to be equal across the three time 
points. Adding this constraint significantly worsened the model (compared to the unconstrained 
                                                          
6 The item “In a bad situation it helps to find a different way of looking at things” (Diff. perspectives) had relatively 
lower loadings compared to other wise reasoning items. In addition, the item “You like to teach things to people” 
(Teaching to others) was different from the other two advice-giving items, which involved being asked for advice. I 
still found the same pattern of results for the cross-lagged panel and trait stability models without these items (see 
supplementary analyses in Appendix A). 
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model), Δχ2(2) = 121.79, p < .001, which suggests that correlation between advice giving and 
wise attitudes changes over time. Overall, these findings support my prediction that advice 
giving and wise attitudes are positively associated with each other. 
To examine the causal relationship between advice giving and wise attitudes, I examined 
the cross-lagged paths between the two constructs. These paths represent the change (in rank 
relative to other individuals in the sample) in construct Y as predicted by construct X at an 
earlier time point, controlling for the effect of construct Y at an earlier time point. As shown in 
Figure 2, advice giving predicted wiser attitudes across both time points. I tested whether I could 
estimate an overall effect by constraining the cross-lagged paths to be equal, and this constraint 
did not affect the model, Δχ2(1) = 2.75, p = .097. I then estimated the overall effect by looking at 
this constrained model, B = 0.22, SE = 0.03, z = 7.30, 95% CI [0.16, 0.28], p < .001. Looking at 
the other direction, wise attitudes at Time 2 predicted advice giving at Time 3 (see Figure 2). 
There was no significant effect of wise attitudes at Time 1 on advice giving at Time 2. 
In summary, the cross-lagged panel model showed that, advice giving was positively 
associated with wise attitudes. In addition, greater advice giving predicted wiser attitudes over 
the course of 20 years. There is some evidence that wise attitudes can lead to greater advice 
giving; however, this was only from Time 2 to Time 3. 
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Figure 2. Cross-lagged panel model of advice-giving tendencies and wisdom-related attitudes 
across three time points (T1, T2, and T3). Circles represent latent variables. Unstandardized 
estimates and significant errors are shown. The straight arrows represent regression paths and the 
curved arrows represent correlations between the residuals of the latent variables. *p < .05, **p < 
.01, ***p < .001. 
Discussion 
 The longitudinal analysis reported here supports philosophical and psychological 
accounts that link advice giving and wise attitudes (e.g., Kramer, 1983; Maxwell, 1984; 
McAdams, 2006; Tiberius, 2008; Tiwald, 2012). Looking within each wave, advice giving and 
wise attitudes are positively associated with each other. Looking across time points, the cross-
lagged panel model supports my hypothesis that advice giving leads to wiser reasoning later in 
life. I found a less consistent pattern for the opposite direction, with wise attitudes predicting 
advice giving only from Time 2 to Time 3. This discrepancy may be due to history effects. One 
possibility is that this transition happened between 2005 and 2014, which included the Great 
Recession in the United States. Perhaps wisely navigating through this uncertain time 
encouraged more generative behaviors like advice giving in later years (McAdams, 2006). 
 One limitation of this study is that assessments were done every 10 years. As a result, this 
data cannot capture more short-term effects of advice giving on wise reasoning. Further, findings 
from daily diary research suggests that wisdom can fluctuate from day to day (Grossmann et al., 
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2016). To directly test the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning, I experimentally 
manipulated advice giving in studies 2, 3 and 4. 
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CHAPTER 3: WISE REASONING IN RECALLED ADVICE-GIVING SITUATIONS 
Study 2 
The main purpose of Study 2 was to examine whether recalled situations where people 
gave advice (advice condition) involved a greater degree of wise reasoning compared to 
situations where people faced a problem alone (personal dilemma condition). I also wanted to 
explore the possibility that being in an interaction that involved advice – without actually giving 
it – might already lead to wiser reasoning. Any situation that involves advice requires 
mentalizing, which could contribute to wise reasoning processes like the recognition of others’ 
perspectives (Epley & Waytz, 2010). Prior research has shown that being in a social (vs. non-
social) situation or thinking about what another person thinks of an issue, is associated to wiser 
reasoning (Grossmann et al., 2016; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996).  
To address this possibility, I included two more control conditions, where participants did 
not give advice, but rather heard advice being given. One condition had people recall events 
where they heard advice being given to others (non-personal condition). In addition, I found in 
an unpublished study that participants reported wiser reasoning when recalling situations in 
which they gave (n = 314, M = 3.50, SE = 0.04) rather than received advice (n = 319, M = 3.34, 
SE = 0.04) about social dilemmas, F(1, 607) = 7.84, p = .005, ηp2 = .013 (Santos, Grossmann, & 
Friedman, 2014). I thus included a fourth condition, where people recalled times when they 
received advice (advice receiving condition). This condition aimed to replicate this preliminary 
finding under more standardized conditions void of other variables and manipulations that may 
have influenced prior results7.  In both conditions, participants interacted with other people to 
address a social dilemma without giving advice themselves. As I expected giving advice to be a 
                                                          
7 The preliminary finding came from a large, unrelated study on humor and reasoning, which included 
manipulations of mood and the quality of advice recalled, as well as multiple other state and trait measures.  
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unique process, I predicted that advice giving would lead to wiser reasoning compared to the 
personal dilemma, non-personal advice, and advice receiving conditions (see 
https://osf.io/8qnqg/ for preregistered hypothesis and analysis plan). 
Method 
Participants. I recruited U.S. American and Canadian adults using the online labour 
market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid 0.75 USD. I aimed to have 
150 participants per cell. As there were no prior studies that could be used for power analysis, I 
chose a level of power (.80) and correlation (r = .23, which is slightly above the average 
correlation of .21 in social and personality psychology research; Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 
2003). According to the G*Power statistical program, the recommended sample size with these 
parameters was 146. I rounded up that figure to 150 and recruited 1.15 times that number (175 
per cell) to account for online attrition that I observed in past studies that I have conducted on 
MTurk. Initially, 725 participants completed the survey8. I excluded 14 participants for failing an 
attention check item that asked them to respond “not at all.”  
Two trained raters also identified participants who wrote about events that did not 
involve advice or did not follow the prompt (e.g., writing about times they received advice when 
asked to describe problems they faced alone). Due to time constraints, I chose to have the raters 
each code a subset of the data (Hallgren, 2012). First, I trained two raters on a set of 54 responses 
that the three of us coded together. Afterwards, raters coded 54 responses individually (both 
coding the same set of responses). When coding individually, raters showed a high amount of 
agreement (Cohen’s kappa = .74), and I made a decision on any remaining discrepancies in this 
                                                          
8 I only paid 700 participants. An additional 25 participants completed the survey but did not claim their payment 
from MTurk. As the participants’ responses are anonymized and stored separately from MTurk, I could not track 
down who these participants were. If any of these participants gave low-quality responses, they were most likely 
excluded from the study, given my exclusion criteria. 
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set. After this training period, each rater coded half of the remaining responses. Based on this 
coding, I excluded 172 participants.  
Finally, I excluded 3 participants who spent under 30 seconds writing about the social 
dilemma, as it suggests that they did not spend much time thinking about that situation. After 
exclusions, the final sample was 536. There was no significant difference in the number of 
excluded participants by condition (between 40 and 55), F(3,721) = 1.97, p = .12, ηp2 = .008. 
Table 1 shows the demographic information for the included participants. 
 Experimental procedure. I randomly assigned participants to one of four conditions. 
They were asked to recall a concrete event where they either (a) gave advice, (b) worked through 
a personal dilemma by themselves, (c) heard advice someone else received, or (d) received 
advice.  The prompt for participants defined social dilemmas as “difficult problems where we 
have to think about what to do next or how to handle a certain situation. For example, one such 
dilemma is figuring out how to tell a friend that he is making some bad decisions without ruining 
the friendship.” 
 In the advice giving condition (n = 152), participants read the following prompt: 
When someone is dealing with a social dilemma and talks to us about it, we 
sometimes give that person advice. Advice could range from a short statement to 
a detailed recommendation. What is important is that you gave someone guidance 
on what to do about a problem. 
Now think about a recent time when you gave someone advice about a social 
dilemma. 
 In the personal dilemma condition (n = 121), participants read the following prompt: 
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When we are dealing with a social dilemma, we sometimes choose to manage it 
by ourselves. That means that we avoid discussing it with other people or asking 
their opinion. What is important is that you managed this problem by yourself, 
without seeking guidance from others.  
Now think about a recent time when you went through a social dilemma and 
managed it by yourself. 
In the non-personal advice condition (n = 124), participants read the following prompt: 
When someone is dealing with a social dilemma, they sometimes receive advice 
about it from someone else. Advice could range from a short statement to a 
detailed recommendation. What is important is that you were not the one who 
gave this person advice about a problem. 
Now think about a recent time when you heard the advice someone received 
about a social dilemma.  
In the advice receiving condition (n = 139), participants read the following prompt: 
When we are dealing with a social dilemma and talk to other people about it, we 
sometimes receive advice. Advice could range from a short statement to a detailed 
recommendation. What is important is that someone gave you guidance on what 
to do about a problem. 
Now think about a recent time when you received advice about a social 
dilemma.  
Participants then described what the situation was and then, depending on the condition, 
described the advice they gave/received/heard or their thoughts about the situation. Afterwards 
they all filled out a measure of wise reasoning.  
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 Wise reasoning measure. Drawing from prior research on wise reasoning, I used a 21-
item scale to assess the extent to which people engage in various aspects of wise reasoning when 
reflecting on the advice situation (Situated Wise Reasoning Scale; Brienza et al., 2017). This 
measure had five subscales measuring different dimensions of wise reasoning: a) the recognition 
of others’ perspectives (4 items; α = .89), b) the recognition of change and uncertainty (4 items; 
α = .78), c) intellectual humility (4 items; α = .82), d) the search for compromise and conflict 
resolution (5 items; α = .85), and e) the application of an outsider’s vantage point (4 items; α = 
.86). Participants rated the degree to which they engaged in each aspect of wise reasoning on a 5-
point scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = Very much) and the overall scale was reliable, (α = .93). I 
averaged the items for each dimension and averaged the five dimensions to compute an overall 
wise reasoning score, which gave equal weights to each dimension. 
 The Situated Wise Reasoning Scale has been validated in prior work (Brienza et al., 
2017). Specifically, the five subscales described above converge into one latent wise reasoning 
construct. In addition, the measure shows convergent validity with other theorized constructs, 
while still being distinct from other established scales, such as those measuring openness, 
mindfulness, and emotional intelligence. In addition, this measure is not associated with 
measures of socially desirable responding and bias blind spot, which suggest that participants are 
not likely to report wiser reasoning to present a positive self-characterization. 
Results  
 To test my chief hypothesis, I conducted planned contrasts between the advice giving 
condition and other conditions. Next, I conducted post-hoc tests to examine any other differences 
between conditions. 
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Wise Reasoning Composite. Testing for homogeneity of variance assumption yielded a 
marginal effect, F(3, 532) = 2.46, p = .062. To be conservative, I conducted my analyses as if the 
assumption was violated and used Welch’s F and Games-Howell post-hoc tests. A planned 
contrast analysis showed that participants who gave advice reasoned more wisely compared to 
participants from other conditions, although this effect was only marginally significant, F(1, 
306.62) = 3.50, p = .062, ηp2 = .006 (see Figure 3). Looking at post-hoc Games-Howell contrasts 
between each condition, participants who either gave or received advice reasoned more wisely 
than those who faced a personal dilemma, advice giving vs. personal dilemma: t(230.65) = 3.11, 
p = .011, advice receiving vs. personal dilemma: t(242.69) = 3.19, p = .009. There were no other 
differences between conditions. These findings held when statistically controlling for how much 
time passed since the recalled event occurred (see supplementary analyses in Appendix C). 
  
 
Figure 3. Bar chart of the effect of advice condition on the wise reasoning composite score. 
Individual wisdom dimensions.  A planned contrast analysis showed that compared to 
participants in other conditions, those in the advice giving condition scored significantly higher 
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on recognition of others’ perspectives, F(1, 296.71) = 12.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .021, and the search 
for compromise/conflict resolution dimensions, F(1, 304.06) = 4.97, p = .026, ηp2 = .008 (see 
Table 3). Looking at the post-hoc contrasts between each condition, advice giving led to greater 
recognition of other’s perspectives, t(225.29) = 3.98, p = .001. In addition, advice giving and 
advice receiving led to greater application of an outsider’s vantage point compared to facing 
personal dilemma, advice giving vs. personal dilemma: t(233.56) = 2.81, p = .028, advice 
receiving vs. personal dilemma: t(240.55) = 2.18, p = .004. The planned contrast between advice 
giving and the other conditions was not significant for the outsider dimension, F(1, 302.77) = 
1.97, p = .161. Although this finding seems at odds with the significant post-hoc contrast 
between the advice giving and personal dilemma conditions, there was also no significant 
difference in the post-hoc contrast between giving and receiving advice, t(283.86) = 0.86, p < 
.275.  
Comparing the advice giving condition to the other conditions, there were no significant 
differences in the recognition of change/uncertainty, F(1, 288.75) = 1.17, p < .275, ηp2 = .002, 
and intellectual humility, F(1, 283.72) = 0.52, p < .275. Notably, post-hoc tests revealed that 
participants who received advice reported greater intellectual humility compared to those who 
gave advice, t(288.08) = 2.75, p = .032, or faced a personal dilemma, t(241.53) = 4.01, p < .001 
(see Table 3). There were no other significant contrasts. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Means and Confidence Intervals for the Effect of Condition on Wise Reasoning 
Dimensions 
 Perspectives Change Humility Compromise Outsider 
Advice Giving 3.75 
[3.60, 3.90] 
3.71 
[3.08, 3.58] 
3.08 
[2.92, 3.23] 
3.62 
[3.48, 3.77] 
3.36 
[3.19, 3.53] 
Personal Dilemma 3.24 3.57 2.88 3.35 2.98 
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[3.07, 3.41] [3.41, 3.71] [2.70, 3.05] [3.19, 3.52] [2.79, 3.17] 
Non-personal Advice 3.53 
[3.36, 3.70] 
3.59 
[3.13, 3.44] 
3.13 
[2.96, 3.31] 
3.39 
[3.23, 3.55] 
3.19 
[3.00, 3.38] 
Advice Receiving 3.53 
[3.38, 3.69] 
3.71 
[3.57, 3.85] 
3.39 
[3.22, 3.56] 
3.54 
[3.39, 3.70] 
3.47 
[3.29, 3.64] 
Note: Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals are presented within the brackets. 
Discussion 
 In Study 2, I obtained experimental evidence for the effect of advice giving on wise 
reasoning. Participants who recalled situations where they gave advice reported wiser reasoning 
compared to those who recalled situations where they faced a personal dilemma. This effect was 
driven primarily by increased recognition of different perspectives, search for compromise and 
conflict resolution, and application of an outsider’s vantage point. These are all dimensions that 
involve looking for and integrating different points of view, which suggest that advice giving 
encourages people to understand the mental state of others. 
 Although participants in the advice giving condition generally reported wiser reasoning 
compared to all other conditions, I did not find a significant difference in the individual contrasts 
between the advice giving condition, non-personal advice, and advice receiving conditions, 
which suggests that this effect may not be unique to giving advice. Participants in these three 
conditions recalled social interactions, which may have encouraged thinking about others’ 
mental processes. I addressed these issues in Study 3 by standardizing the social dilemma. 
 One other notable finding was that people who received advice were more intellectually 
humble than those who gave advice or faced a dilemma alone. I did not predict these contrasts, 
but it makes sense in hindsight, because people often seek and receive advice from people more 
knowledgeable than them in a given domain (Jungermann & Fischer, 2005). 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECT OF ADVICE GIVING ON WISE REASONING ABOUT 
STANDARDIZED DILEMMAS 
Study 3 
Study 3 was conducted concurrently with Study 2, and its main purpose was to examine 
whether advice giving had additional effects on wise reasoning over and above the effect of 
psychological distance (Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Kross & Grossmann, 2012). In Study 3, I 
kept the advice giving and personal dilemma conditions and added another condition where 
participants reflected on a friend’s dilemma without asking them to give any advice. In addition, 
I standardized the social dilemma by having participants all react to the same hypothetical 
situation. This addressed the possibility raised in Study 2 that participants might have recalled 
different kinds of social dilemmas depending on the condition. I predicted that giving advice 
would involve wiser reasoning than imagining going through the dilemma or merely reflecting 
on a friend’s dilemma (see https://osf.io/8qnqg/ for preregistered hypothesis and analysis plan). 
Method 
Participants. I recruited U.S. American and Canadian adults using the online labour 
market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid 0.75 USD. I conducted this 
study at the same time as Study 2, and people who completed Study 2 were not eligible for this 
study and vice-versa. As with Study 2, I aimed to have 150 participants per cell, and recruited 
1.15 times that number (175 per cell) in order to account for online attrition on MTurk. Initially, 
492 participants made it to the end of the survey. I excluded 8 participants for failing an attention 
check item, 34 participants for not following instructions in the friend condition as coded by 
trained raters (i.e., giving advice when instructed to reflect on a friend’s dilemma is grounds for 
exclusion; Cohen’s kappa = .84), 5 participants for spending less than 30 seconds writing about 
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the dilemma, and 20 participants for having previously done a study on wisdom and advice. 
After exclusions, the final sample was 416. Table 1 shows the demographic information for the 
included participants. 
 Experimental procedure. Participants all read a newspaper advice column about a 
person in the middle of a social dilemma – the protagonist is in the middle of an argument 
between two friends, and he is forced to take sides (see Appendix D for materials). The 
dilemmas were adapted from “Dear Abby” letters, originally used by Grossmann and colleagues 
(2010).  I randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions, which framed the dilemma 
in different ways: (a) giving advice to a friend, (b) hearing about a friend’s dilemma, or (c) 
experiencing a personal dilemma.  
In the advice giving condition (n = 160), the protagonist was a close friend who was 
asking for advice on the matter. Participants saw the following prompt: “Please pick one of your 
close friends. Imagine that your friend is going through this conflict and wrote this letter to the 
newspaper. What advice would you give your friend about this conflict?” 
In the friend condition (n = 108), the protagonist was a close friend, but there was no 
mention of advice seeking. Participants saw the following prompt: “Please pick one of your close 
friends. Imagine that your friend is going through this conflict and wrote this letter to the 
newspaper. What thoughts do you have about your friend's conflict?” 
In the personal dilemma condition (n = 148), the participants imagine themselves as the 
protagonist. Participants saw the following prompt: “Imagine that you are going through this 
conflict and wrote this letter to the newspaper. What thoughts do you have about this conflict?” 
Participants then wrote their responses to the question and filled out a measure of wise 
reasoning.  
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Wise reasoning measure. I used the same measure of wise reasoning that was reported 
in Study 2. Each of the subscales was reliable: a) the recognition of others’ perspectives (4 items; 
α = .89), b) the recognition of change and uncertainty (4 items; α = .76), c) intellectual humility 
(4 items; α = .80), d) the search for compromise and conflict resolution (5 items; α = .81), and e) 
the application of an outsider’s vantage point (4 items; α = .78). The overall scale was also 
reliable (α = .92), so I averaged the items for each dimension and averaged the five dimensions 
to compute an overall wise reasoning score. 
Results 
 I tested a planned contrast between advice giving and all other conditions, which 
addresses the main hypothesis of Study 3. Next, I conducted a post-hoc test to examine any other 
differences between conditions. 
 Wise Reasoning Composite. This data met the assumption for homogeneity of variance, 
F(2, 412) = 1.30, p > .275. A planned contrast analysis showed that participants in the advice 
giving condition reported wiser reasoning compared to those from the other two conditions, F(1, 
413) = 3.99, p = .047, ηp2 = .010 (see Figure 4). Post-hoc Tukey contrasts between each 
condition did not reveal any significant differences. Overall, these results provide some support 
for my hypothesis that advice giving leads to wiser reasoning compared to reasoning about one’s 
own or a friend’s problem.  
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Figure 4. Bar chart of the effect of advice condition on the wise reasoning composite score. 
Individual wisdom dimensions.  Planned contrast analyses showed that compared to 
those from other conditions, participants in the advice giving condition scored significantly 
higher on the recognition of others’ perspectives, F(1, 413) = 4.12, p = .043, ηp2 = .010, 
recognition of change/uncertainty, F(1, 413) = 7.86, p = .005, ηp2 = .019, and search for 
compromise/conflict resolution dimensions, F(1, 413) = 9.37, p = .002, ηp2 = .022 (see Table 5). 
Looking at the post-hoc tests between each condition, advice giving led to higher ratings 
compared to the person dilemma condition on the change/uncertainty dimension, t(307) = 2.88, p 
= .012, and the compromise/resolution dimension, t(307) = 3.22, p = .004 (see Table 4). The 
planned contrast analyses did not show any significant differences for intellectual humility, F(1, 
413) = 0.16, p > .275, ηp2 < .001, and the application of an outsider’s vantage point dimensions, 
F(1, 413) = 0.01, p > .275, ηp2 < .001. None of the other contrasts yielded any significant results 
for these dimensions. 
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Table 4. Means and Confidence Intervals for the Effect of Condition on Wise Reasoning 
Dimensions 
 Perspectives Change Humility Compromise Outsider 
Advice Giving 3.62 
[3.47, 3.77] 
3.70 
[3.57, 3.82] 
3.00 
[2.85, 3.16] 
3.72 
[3.58, 3.85] 
3.10 
[2.95, 3.25] 
Personal Dilemma 3.40 
[3.24, 3.55] 
3.43 
[3.30, 3.56] 
2.96 
[2.80, 3.12] 
3.40 
[3.27, 3.54] 
3.13 
[2.97, 3.29] 
Friend 3.46 
[3.28, 3.64] 
3.52 
[3.37, 3.67] 
2.96 
[2.77, 3.15] 
3.52 
[3.36, 3.68] 
3.07 
[2.85, 3.22] 
Note: Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals are presented within the brackets. 
Discussion 
 Study 3 provides further support for the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning. 
Participants who gave advice about a standardized scenario reasoned more wisely compared to 
those in other conditions. Specifically, participants who gave advice were more likely than those 
who reflected on a personal dilemma to recognize the perspectives of other people, change and 
uncertainty, and the importance of compromise and conflict resolution. Overall, the evidence 
shows that advice giving leads to increased reports of wise reasoning. 
The individual contrasts revealed no significant difference between the advice giving and 
the friend conditions. There was also no difference between the friend and personal dilemma 
conditions, which suggests that psychological distance might play a role in advice giving, 
although the study may not have been well powered or designed in a way that distinguished 
between the three conditions. I will consider implications of this observation for possible 
mechanisms underlying effects of advice giving for wise reasoning in the general discussion.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE EFFECT OF ADVICE GIVING ON WISE REASONING ABOUT AN 
UNRELATED DILEMMA 
Study 4 
Study 4 had three objectives. The first objective was to replicate the effect of advice 
giving vs. self-reflection on wise reasoning. With this goal in mind, I kept the advice giving and 
self conditions in this study and largely followed the same procedures as in Study 3.  
The second objective was to test the generalizability of the effect to an unrelated 
dilemma. While giving advice may help people reason more wisely in a given situation, people 
may continue using these adaptive strategies for other problems. To examine the possible 
priming effect of advice giving, after the completing the tasks described in Study 3, I presented 
participants with an unrelated dilemma and asked them to reflect on it, upon which participants 
indicated the extent to which they engaged in wise reasoning.  
 The third objective was to address some shortcomings in the Study 3 stimuli. To account 
for any idiosyncratic effects of the particular conflict participants read in Study 3, participants in 
the current study read about one of two dilemmas when asked to give advice or reflect on it by 
themselves. The dilemma that participants did not read eventually became the unrelated dilemma 
that they had to reason about later in the study. I also modified the dilemma vignette used in 
Study 3 to remove any demand characteristics.  
In total, Study 4 examined two hypotheses (see https://osf.io/8qnqg/ for preregistered 
hypotheses and analysis plan): (1) People who give advice about the dilemma (vs. address a 
personal dilemma) will report wiser reasoning compared to those who reflected on a problem by 
themselves. (2) People who give advice will reason more wisely about an unrelated dilemma. 
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Method 
Participants. I recruited U.S. American and Canadian adults using the online labour 
market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participants were paid 1.00 USD. People who 
completed either Study 2 or 3 were not eligible for this study. I used G*Power to estimate a 
replication of the change/uncertainty finding (which was the weaker of the two findings in the 
previous study) with .80 power. This yielded a sample size of 134 per cell. Because participants 
read one of two stories, I planned to power a study with four cells (2 stories, 2 conditions), which 
yielded a sample size of 536. I multiplied this by 1.35 to account for the attrition rate from Study 
3, yielding a final sample of 724. Seven hundred twenty-nine participants made it to the end of 
the survey. Using new self-report attention measures, 11 participants excluded themselves from 
the study (most said they did not want me to use their data; one reported being biased against 
Dear Abby writers), and I excluded 65 participants for reporting little engagement or seriousness 
while doing the study. In addition, I excluded 11 participants for spending less than 30 seconds 
writing about the dilemma, and 14 participants for having previously done a study on wisdom 
and advice. After exclusions, the final sample was 630. Table 1 shows the demographic 
information for the included participants. 
Experimental procedure. Participants read about an initial dilemma, and were asked to 
either give advice to a friend experiencing this problem or imagine it happening to them 
personally. They wrote their thoughts about this dilemma and filled out a wise reasoning 
measure, where they reported how they thought about the initial conflict. Afterwards, 
participants in both conditions read about an unrelated dilemma, and imagined it happening to 
them personally. They wrote their thoughts about this unrelated dilemma and filled out a wise 
reasoning measure, where they reported how they thought about the problem.  
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For the initial dilemma, participants all read a newspaper advice column. One of two 
dilemmas was randomly selected for the participant: (1) the protagonist is in the middle of an 
argument between two friends, and he is forced to take sides; (2) the protagonist’s sibling made a 
family purchase without informing the other siblings and now wants everyone to contribute 
money for it (see Appendix E for materials). The dilemmas were adapted from “Dear Abby” 
letters used by Grossmann and colleagues (2010). In contrast to Study 3, I removed a line from 
the dilemma used in that study that said “I don't know how to explain to her that as they are both 
my friends, I would rather be left out of their arguments and not have to choose sides,” as it 
hinted at what kind of answer participants should give. I randomly assigned participants to one of 
two conditions, which framed the dilemma in different ways: (a) giving advice to a friend or (b) 
experiencing the dilemma by themselves. 
In the advice giving condition (n = 310), the protagonist was a close friend who was 
asking for advice on the matter. Participants saw the following prompt: “Imagine that your 
friend is going through this conflict and wrote this letter to the newspaper. What advice would 
you give your friend about this conflict?” Compared to Study 3, I no longer asked participants to 
choose a close friend; this revision simplified the prompt and matched its structure to the prompt 
used in the other condition. 
In the personal dilemma condition (n = 318), the participants imagine themselves as the 
protagonist. Participants saw the following prompt: “Imagine that you are going through this 
conflict and wrote this letter to the newspaper. What thoughts do you have about this conflict?” 
Participants then wrote their responses to the question and filled out a measure of wise 
reasoning.  
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Next, for the unrelated dilemma, participants read the dilemma that they did not see in the 
first part of the study. I no longer framed the dilemma as a letter to a newspaper, and asked 
participants to imagine this conflict happening to them personally. After reading the about the 
dilemma, participants were asked, “How do you think this conflict will unfold?” They then wrote 
their responses to the question and filled out a measure of wise reasoning. 
 Wise reasoning measure. I used the same measure of wise reasoning after both the 
initial and unrelated dilemmas. Each of the subscales was reliable: a) the recognition of others’ 
perspectives (4 items; αinitial = .91, αunrelated = .93), b) the recognition of change and uncertainty (4 
items; αinitial = .86, αunrelated = .89), c) intellectual humility (4 items; αinitial = .80, αunrelated = .86), d) 
the search for compromise and conflict resolution (5 items; αinitial = .85, αunrelated = .88), and e) 
the application of an outsider’s vantage point (4 items; αinitial = .87, αunrelated = .92). The overall 
scale was also reliable (αinitial = .94, αunrelated = .95), so I averaged the items for each dimension 
and averaged the five dimensions to compute an overall wise reasoning score. 
Results 
 Initial Dilemma Wise Reasoning. This data met the assumption for homogeneity of 
variance, F(1, 626) = 0.63, p > .275. In support of Hypothesis 1, participants who gave advice 
reasoned more wisely about the initial dilemma (M = 3.50, SE = .04) compared to those who 
reflected by themselves (M = 3.35, SE = .04), F(1, 626) = 5.98, p = .015, ηp2 = .009.  
Looking at individual dimensions, participants in the advice giving condition reported a 
greater recognition of others’ perspectives, F(1, 626) = 9.30, p = .002, ηp2 = .015, recognition of 
change/uncertainty, F(1, 626) = 5.57, p = .019, ηp2 = .009, and the search for 
compromise/conflict resolution, F(1, 626) = 5.75, p = .017, ηp2 = .009 (see Figure 5). There was 
no significant effect of condition on intellectual humility, F(1, 626) = 0.61, p < .275, ηp2 < .001, 
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and the application of an outsider’s vantage point, F(1, 626) = 2.12, p = .145, ηp2 = .003. For 
overall wise reasoning and the individual dimensions, there was no significant interaction 
between condition and the type of dilemma participants read, ps > .200. 
 
Figure 5. Bar chart of the effect of condition on the initial dilemma wise reasoning dimensions. 
Unrelated Dilemma Wise Reasoning. This data met the assumption for homogeneity of 
variance, F(1, 626) = 0.02, p > .275. In support of Hypothesis 2, participants who gave advice 
reasoned more wisely about the unrelated dilemma (M = 3.46, SE = .05) compared to those who 
reflected by themselves (M = 3.29, SE = .05), F(1, 626) = 6.00, p = .015, ηp2 = .009.  
Looking at individual dimensions, participants in the advice giving condition reported 
greater intellectual humility, F(1, 626) = 6.85, p = .009, ηp2 = .011, and application of an 
outsider’s vantage point, F(1, 626) = 6.88, p = .009, ηp2 = .011 (see Figure 6). Additionally 
participants in the advice giving condition reported marginally greater recognition of others’ 
perspectives, F(1, 625) = 3.59, p = .059, ηp2 = .006. There was no significant effect of condition 
on the recognition of change/uncertainty, F(1, 625) = 2.50, p = .114, ηp2 = .004, and the search 
for compromise/conflict resolution, F(1, 626) = 1.95, p = .162, ηp2 = .003. For overall wise 
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reasoning and the individual dimensions, there was no significant interaction between condition 
and the type of dilemma participants read, ps > .250. 
 
Figure 6. Bar chart of the effect of condition on the unrelated dilemma wise reasoning 
dimensions. 
Statistical Mediation. I then tested whether the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning 
(and its individual dimensions) about the unrelated dilemma was mediated by how people 
reasoned about the initial dilemma. I found a full mediation for the wise reasoning composite, 
95% CI [-0.208, -0.020], p = .016, the recognition of multiple perspectives, 95% CI [-0.211, -
0.050], p = .003, and the recognition of change/uncertainty dimensions, 95% CI [-0.163, -0.010], 
p = .022. I also found a partial mediation for search for the compromise/conflict resolution 
dimension, 95% CI [-0.167, -0.020], p = .015. For all dimensions, advice giving led to greater 
dimension ratings for the initial dilemma, which led to greater dimension ratings for the 
unrelated dilemma (see Table 5). I did not find a significant mediation effect for intellectual 
humility, 95% CI [-0.156, 0.070], p > .275, or the application of an outsider’s perspective, 95% 
CI [-0.198, 0.020], p = .136. In summary, the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning in the 
subsequent dilemma is largely explained by how wisely people reasoned in the initial dilemma.  
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Table 5. Advice Giving  Initial Dilemma  Unrelated Dilemma Mediation Model 
Wise Reasoning Dimension Path A (Advice  
Initial Dilemma) 
Path B (Initial Dilemma  
 Unrelated Dilemma) 
Path C (Advice     
Unrelated Dilemma) 
Overall Wise Reasoning B(SE) 0.15(0.06)*** 0.07(0.03)*** 0.05(0.05) 
p <.001 <.001 .313 
Perspective B(SE) 0.23(0.08)** 0.55(0.04)*** 0.03(0.07) 
p .002 <.001 .688 
Change B(SE) 0.16(0.07)* 0.52(0.03)*** 0.03(0.07) 
p .021 <.001 .640 
Humility B(SE) 0.06(0.07) 0.73(0.03)*** 0.18(0.06)** 
p .416 <.001 .006 
Compromise 
 
B(SE) 0.17(0.07)* 0.55(0.03)*** 0.55(0.04)*** 
p .015 <.001 <.001 
Outsider B(SE) 0.12(0.09) 0.70(0.03)*** 0.15(0.07) 
p .142 <.001 .031 
Note: Unstandardized regression estimates are shown. Path C presents the effect of condition on 
the unrelated dilemma controlling for the initial dilemma. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .0001. 
 
Discussion 
 In Study 4, I tested two hypotheses looking at whether advice giving would lead to (1) 
wiser reasoning about an initial dilemma and (2) wiser reasoning about an unrelated dilemma. I 
found support for both hypotheses. 
 Replicating the findings of Study 3, advice giving in Study 4 led to wiser reasoning about 
a friend’s dilemma compared to reflecting on a personal dilemma. As with the previous study, 
this effect was driven by a greater recognition of others’ perspectives, of change and uncertainty 
in the world, and of the value of compromise and conflict resolution.  
 Further, these findings were not limited to the situation that involved advice giving. 
People in the advice giving condition also reasoned more wisely about an unrelated dilemma. In 
this separate scenario, there was no prompt to give advice. In addition, the psychological 
distance potentially involved in advice giving was removed, as they had to imagine that they 
were facing a dilemma personally. The effect of advice giving on wise reasoning was driven by 
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greater intellectual humility and application of an outsider’s vantage point. These findings 
suggest that advice giving can prime wise reasoning in future conflicts. 
Notably, advice giving affected different dimensions of wise reasoning in the initial and 
unrelated dilemmas. This discrepancy has two implications. First, it rules out the possibility that 
participants were influenced by demand characteristics and merely answered the wise reasoning 
measure in the same manner both times. While I did find a full mediation (from advice giving  
initial dilemma  unrelated dilemma) for the perspectives and change/uncertainty dimensions, 
there was only a partial mediation for the compromise dimension. In addition, while there was no 
effect of advice giving on the outsider dimension in the initial dilemma, advisors later scored 
higher on this dimension when reflecting about the unrelated dilemma. These differences suggest 
that there was some variation in how participants answered the wise reasoning measures for the 
different dilemmas.  
Second, the results for the initial and unrelated dilemmas suggest that advice giving 
might have influenced different dimensions of wise reasoning across situations. While thinking 
about the unrelated dilemma, participants in the advice giving condition did not simply reuse the 
strategies they utilized in the initial dilemma. Instead, they moved from dimensions of wise 
reasoning that focused on the context (i.e., considering perspectives, change/uncertainty, and 
change/compromise) to dimensions that focused on reducing ego-centrism (i.e., being 
intellectually humble, taking an outsider’s vantage point). These post-hoc groupings could reflect 
how wise reasoning is expressed in different kinds of situations. One possibility is that the type 
of situation matters. With regards to the initial dilemma, advisors tend think more abstractly and 
pay attention to a wider array of information compared to a personal decision-maker (with the 
eventual goal of narrowing down options; Danziger et al., 2012; Jonas et al., 2005; Jungermann 
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& Fischer, 2005; Kalkstein et al., 2016; Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). As a result, while advice 
giving might promote wiser reasoning as a whole, this effect might be particularly strong for 
dimensions focusing on the context. Subsequently, advice giving might have primed wiser 
reasoning, but the unrelated dilemma that participants next read about was framed as a personal 
dilemma. As people facing a personal dilemma are focused on their own thoughts and feelings 
(relative to someone in an interpersonal situation), reducing ego-centrism might be the more 
applicable wise strategy.  
Overall, Study 4 replicated previous findings and suggest that advice giving in a given 
situation may promote wise reasoning in future dilemmas. Although this study examined short-
term effects, this finding is the first step in understanding the downstream effects of advice 
giving on cognitive processes. 
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Advice is an important part of social life, particularly when making decisions. Prior 
research has chiefly focused on the psychological processes involved in receiving advice 
(Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). With regards to advice giving, developmental theorists argue that it 
can lead to the development of greater wisdom (e.g., Erikson et al., 1987; Erikson, 1950; 
McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992; Slater, 2003). Indeed, advice giving involves socio-cognitive 
processes such as mentalization and psychological distance, all of which could hypothetically 
contribute to wiser reasoning (e.g., Danziger et al., 2012; Kross & Grossmann, 2012; Lombrozo, 
2006; Staudinger & Baltes, 1996). My dissertation drew on prior theoretical insights from 
developmental and socio-cognitive psychology, testing whether advice giving promotes wisdom-
related attitudes and cognitions. I predicted that advice giving would lead to wiser reasoning 
compared to personal decision making.  
In Study 1, I examined twenty years of longitudinal data from a large, national sample of 
U.S. Americans, observing that advice giving and wisdom-related characteristics are cross-
sectionally associated with each other. Further, I found some evidence that advice giving 
contributed to greater wisdom 10 and 20 years later. I then experimentally manipulated advice 
giving in Study 2, and found that participants who recalled social dilemmas where they gave 
advice reasoned more wisely about that dilemma compared to those recalling a personal 
dilemma. In Study 3, I used a standardized dilemma, and found that participants who were asked 
to give advice to a friend experiencing this dilemma reasoned more wisely than those who 
imagined it happening to them personally. In Study 4, I replicated these findings and also found 
that advice giving about a dilemma can prime wiser reasoning about a separate, unrelated 
dilemma. Taken together, these findings show the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning in 
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multiple domains: across the life course, in recollections of prior experiences, as well as in 
standardized dilemmas presented in a controlled, lab setting. 
Notably, my dissertation revealed that the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning is not 
limited to one interaction. Prior manipulations to increase wise reasoning have only focused on 
shifting people’s mindsets about one problem (Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Huynh et al., 2016; 
Kross & Grossmann, 2012). Only one study so far has looked at how a self-distancing 
manipulation improves the way married couples think about their conflicts over the course of a 
year (Finkel, Slotter, Luchies, Walton, & Gross, 2013). However, this study focused on 
emotional reappraisal and not wise reasoning. The present investigation is the first to show that 
experimentally manipulating wise reasoning can influence how people think about multiple 
problems.  
For the rest of this section, I will discuss the potential mechanisms, unanswered 
questions, and implications of the present investigation. I then discuss some limitations of the 
studies I conducted, along with future directions for this work. 
Potential Psychological Mechanisms 
Aside from comparing advice giving and personal decision-making, I also examined how 
advice giving would compare to two related processes: mentalization and psychological distance. 
As I expected advice giving to be a unique process, I predicted that advice giving would promote 
wise reasoning to a greater degree than either mentalization or psychological distance.  
 Mentalization. Compared to someone making a decision alone, an advisor is more likely 
to simulate or be involved in a social interaction. Interacting with another person usually 
involves mentalization, which is the consideration another person’s mental activity – their needs, 
feelings, goals, and beliefs (Epley & Waytz, 2010; Fonagy et al., 2011; Liljenfors & Lundh, 
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2015). As wise reasoning involves processes like considering and integrating multiple 
perspectives, mentalization could lead to greater wise reasoning. In support of this idea, prior 
work has found that reason more wisely when thinking about social versus non-social events 
(Grossmann et al., 2016). 
 I investigated whether advice giving had effects over and above mentalization in Study 2 
by manipulating the presence of other people in the advice-giving interaction. Study 2 included 
two control conditions (in addition to the personal dilemma condition), where people either 
received advice or heard it being given to someone else (advice receiving and non-personal 
advice conditions, respectively). These two additional conditions involved recalling an 
interaction with someone else, which potentially includes mentalization. Notably, participants in 
these two conditions did not actually giving advice in those interactions. A planned contrast 
showed that advice giving led to wiser reasoning compared to all the control conditions. 
However, when examining post-hoc pairwise comparisons of conditions, the only significant 
contrast concerned advice giving and thinking about personal dilemmas. Advice giving was not 
significantly different from advice receiving or hearing non-personal advice, both of which fell 
in between advice giving and personal decision-making.  
Although I found that advice giving leads to wiser reasoning compared to thinking about 
personal dilemmas, its relationship with other receiving or overhearing advice is unclear. One 
possibility for the discrepancy between the planned contrast and post-hoc analyses is that there 
was not enough power to detect differences between advice giving, advice receiving, and non-
personal advice conditions. Notably, neither the advice receiving nor non-personal advice 
conditions were higher than the personal dilemma condition. This finding suggests that 
mentalization might not play a central role in the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning. 
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Another factor to note is that Study 2 involved recollections of past social dilemmas, and the 
variety of situations involved make it difficult to figure out which factors contributed to wiser 
reasoning for the advice giving, non-personal advice, and advice receiving conditions. The effect 
of mentalization might also be more apparent during an actual interaction instead of a recalled or 
simulated interaction. 
 Psychological Distance. In Study 3, I investigated whether advice giving had 
incremental benefits over the effect of psychological distance. Advisors tend to be more 
psychologically distant from a recipient’s problems (Danziger et al., 2012; Jungermann & 
Fischer, 2005). People construe psychologically distant issues more abstractly (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010), which means that people would take a broader, less self-focused look at a 
given situation. Experimental research also suggests that inducing psychological distance 
through processes like self-distancing promotes wiser reasoning about conflicts (Grossmann & 
Kross, 2014; Kross & Grossmann, 2012). In other words, the effect of advice giving on wise 
reasoning could entirely be the function of increased psychological distance. 
 I investigated whether advice giving had effects over and above psychological distancing 
in Study 3. In this study, I added a control condition (in addition to the personal dilemma 
condition), where people thought about a friend’s problem. This friend condition still involved 
psychological distance without the participant giving advice. A planned contrast showed that 
advice giving led to wiser reasoning compared to the friend and personal dilemma conditions. 
However, when examining post-hoc pairwise comparisons of conditions, I did not observe 
significant differences between any of the conditions.   
 These results suggest that advice giving leads to wiser reasoning overall compared to 
personal decision making. This finding was replicated in Study 4 as well. It seems unlikely that 
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the effect of advice giving can be completely explained by psychological distancing. There were 
no differences between the friend and personal dilemma conditions for overall wise reasoning, 
which might mean that this test was underpowered.  
To summarize the findings of Studies 2 and 3, I found that advice giving promotes wiser 
reasoning compared to personal decision making. Concerning mentalization and psychological 
distance, my findings suggest that these processes do not completely explain advice giving’s 
effect on wiser reasoning. However, I did not find clear differences in my post-hoc tests between 
conditions. Future studies might need increased power and experimental designs that can better 
tease apart the effect of advice giving, mentalization, and psychological distance on wise 
reasoning. 
Unanswered Questions 
Although my work provides evidence for the effect of advice giving on wise reasoning, 
more research is needed to get a better picture of underlying mechanism, outcomes, and 
boundary conditions of this effect. I reflect on some of these potential avenues for future research 
below. 
What is the role of explanation in advice giving? One potential clue in figuring out 
what is special about advice giving is to examine how the advice is shared. Consider giving 
advice to a friend who is caught in a heated conflict with their parents. Someone can give advice 
with a direct recommendation: Apologize to your parents. Alternately, someone can give advice 
by explaining the situation: You should apologize, and let me explain how I think your parents 
are thinking about the situation. The second kind of advice involves more explanation, and 
explanation can help people think more abstractly about a problem (Lombrozo, 2006). 
Specifically, it helps explainers think abstractly in order to give an in-depth solution that can 
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generalize to other similar situations (Blanchard et al., 2017). Thinking abstractly could help the 
explainer move beyond a self-focused perspective and think about a wider set of considerations. 
In addition, explaining a concept can help people realize what they know and what they do not 
know (Rozenblit & Keil, 2002). This realization can lead to greater intellectual humility and 
having balanced views on contentious issues (Fernbach et al., 2013), both of which are involved 
in wise reasoning. As not all advice uses explanation, perhaps advice giving would only be 
effective when there is some explanation involved.  
How does advice giving affect later reasoning processes? Another mechanism that 
needs to be examined is how advice giving influences how people think about later, unrelated 
situations. One observation I made in the present research is that the dimensions involved in wise 
reasoning varied across situations. In Studies 3 and 4, which used standardized dilemmas, the 
effect of advice giving on wise reasoning about the initial dilemma was primarily driven by 
dimensions that focused on the context: recognizing others’ perspectives, acknowledging change 
and uncertainty, and seeking compromise and conflict resolution. Subsequently, the effect of 
wise reasoning on the unrelated dilemma was primarily driven by dimensions that reduced ego-
centrism: Intellectual humility and taking an outsider’s vantage point.  
This finding suggests that advice giving can have different effects depending on the kind 
of situation and when it happens. First, there may be an immediate effect of advice giving in a 
given moment, where individuals think about the wider context. This process might be 
particularly important when giving advice because they have to pay attention to another person 
and learn more about that person’s situation. However, when they think about their own 
problems at a later point, they aim to refrain from being biased. The current investigation did not 
tease apart whether this shift in wise reasoning dimensions was due to the type or timing of the 
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dilemma. Recall that in Study 4, participant reasoned about an initial and unrelated dilemma. 
Looking at the type of dilemma, those in the advice giving condition thought about a friend’s 
dilemma in in the initial stage, but the unrelated dilemma was framed as a personal problem 
(those in the personal dilemma condition thought about personal problems for both conditions). 
Looking at timing, the initial dilemma came immediately after the manipulation, while the 
unrelated dilemma came after the participant had some time to think about the initial dilemma. 
Although it is still unclear whether the type or timing of dilemma is involved in Study 4, my 
findings suggest that wise reasoning manipulations do not necessarily have a uniform effect. 
Methods that boost wise reasoning – like advice giving – may have different effects as people 
think about multiple challenging situations.  
When does advice giving backfire? Although my findings suggest that advice giving 
can lead to wiser reasoning, other work suggests that sharing information with others can lead to 
narrow and extreme views. For instance, discussing an issue with like-minded people can lead to 
more polarized attitudes (Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2010). In addition, explaining one’s 
choices make people believe their interpretation of an event, even if new information invalidates 
their initial account (Ross, Lepper, Strack, & Steinmetz, 1977). This evidence dovetails with 
some work on abstraction, which suggests that thinking abstractly about issues leads to more 
extreme moral judgements (Eyal, Liberman, & Trope, 2008 but also see Eyal, Liberman, & 
Trope, 2014; Gong & Medin, 2012; Žeželj & Jokić, 2014). Advice-givers tend to think about a 
problem more abstractly (Danziger et al., 2012), so they could also end up thinking in more 
absolutist terms. This perspective conflicts with the research I reviewed earlier, which suggested 
that explanations and advice giving can lead to wiser and more balanced reasoning (e.g., 
Fernbach et al., 2013; Jonas et al., 2005; Lombrozo, 2006).  
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One way to resolve these opposing views is to investigate how invested an advisor is in 
their own opinions. Unpublished research investigated this idea by examining the process of 
explanation, which is used in advice giving. In an experimental study conducted before the 2016 
U.S. Presidential elections, explanation (vs. description) led to wiser reasoning about political 
issues only if the individual was not highly invested in their own opinion (Huynh, Santos, Tse, & 
Grossmann, in prep). With this in mind, people who hold an extreme position on a given issue 
may not be good advisors in that particular domain, as they may be thinking in a more close-
minded way.  
Aside from one’s prior beliefs, unbalanced power relationships might also contribute to 
advice giving that backfires. Experimental and field studies suggest that advice giving increases 
one’s sense of power and that people who seek power are more likely to give advice to others 
(Schaerer, Tost, Huang, Gino, & Larrick, 2018). Increased feelings of power can lead to reduced 
perspective-taking (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006), which could contribute to less 
wise reasoning. My current findings show that advice giving leads to increased wise reasoning, 
but it is unclear whether this effect is in spite of the negative effects of power or if it only works 
for people who are not in a position of power. One factor that could moderate the effect of power 
is an advisor’s goals when giving advice. For instance, advisors can give advice either to help 
and care for others or to intrude in another’s life (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). Using this 
framework, perhaps only those who aim to intrude might feel an increase in power.  
Implications 
 The current investigation provides some promising findings regarding the role of advice 
giving in achieving greater wisdom. Prior efforts to promote wisdom have focused on prompts 
that shift an individual’s mindset (Grossmann & Kross, 2014; Kross & Grossmann, 2012). The 
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present research potentially adds advice giving to the set of experimental methods that can 
facilitate wiser reasoning. In particular, Study 4 suggests that some of these effects can spillover 
to other unrelated dilemmas. While previously established methods involve intrapersonal 
processes (e.g., talking to the self using third-person pronouns), advice giving is an interpersonal 
processes. Given that for many problems it is less costly to resolve conflicts by engaging in 
social interactions (e.g., arguments, negotiations) as opposed to making a selfish decision or 
using force (e.g., De Dreu, 2014), it is important to examine how different communication 
processes influence wise reasoning.  
This research also contributes to a greater understanding of advice-related outcomes in 
organizations. Past studies in organizational behavior have largely focused on the benefits of 
receiving advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), and few studies have examined the cognitive 
benefits for the advisor. Understanding the relationship between advice giving and wisdom can 
demonstrate additional intrinsic rewards for potential mentors. This research can also 
organizations with recommendations for how to create social environments that are conducive 
for wiser thinking. For instance, organizations can introduce norms or programs that encourage 
advising others, either as a peer or supervisor. Teams that encourage seeking and giving advice 
could make better collective decisions, and it might lead to improved individual performance.  
 Advice giving can also play an important role in education. Aside from developing 
academic skills, educators are also interested in finding ways to cultivate good character among 
their students (e.g., Althof & Berkowitz, 2006; Lickona, 1996). Teaching students how to wisely 
manage difficult situations in life is one promising route (Sternberg, Jarvin, & Reznitskaya, 
2008). Encouraging advice giving and other forms of peer mentorship may be one way to 
facilitate wiser interaction inside and outside school. This approach dovetails with research that 
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suggests that peer mentoring and even self-explanations can help students learn more effectively 
(Chi, Bassok, Lewis, Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Roscoe & Chi, 2007). Instead of simply using 
peer and self-explanations for academic concepts, educators could also encourage students to 
help each other manage interpersonal conflicts, moral dilemmas, and other life challenges. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While the present research investigated the effects of advice giving using a variety of 
approaches that aimed to address different methodological challenges, some caveats should be 
considered. In discussing these limitations, I will also consider how future research can improve 
on and extend this work. 
Multiple Assessments over Time. In Study 1, I only used items that assessed wisdom-
related attitudes, and not wise reasoning specifically. In addition, these characteristics were 
framed as global attitudes instead of state-specific thoughts and behaviors. As wise reasoning 
varies from situation to situation (Brienza et al., 2017; Grossmann et al., 2016), it is important to 
measure situational contingencies surrounding state-specific wise reasoning across multiple days 
to get an accurate assessment of an individual’s average tendency (Fleeson, 2001; Mischel & 
Shoda, 1995).  
In addition, I only examined the effect of advice giving across particularly long or short 
time spans. Study 1 examined the effect over 10 or 20 years. In contrast, the spillover effect in 
Study 4 was short-term, as there was no filler task in between the initial and unrelated dilemmas. 
The unrelated dilemma was simply framed as being part of “the next part of the study.” These 
time spans may have either been too long or short to detect other meaningful processes that 
might unfold. Micro-longitudinal studies such as daily diaries could capture changes in advice 
giving and wisdom over the course of a few days (e.g., Grossmann et al., 2016). In addition, 
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advice giving is often done in the context of a relationship, like a mentor and a protégé or among 
married couples (e.g., Allen, 2007; Brooks et al., 2015; Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997). This 
relationship means that how advice is given and received can affect future interactions, including 
whether or not the recipient will return to that particular advisor for future support. Assessing 
advice giving and wise reasoning in one relationship with multiple measurements over a year 
could shed light on the long-term effects of advice giving on decisions, conflicts, and satisfaction 
in the relationship (for an example with perspective-taking and conflict resolution, see Finkel et 
al., 2013). 
Perceptions and Outcomes of Advice. In the current investigation, I focused on the 
mental processes involved in advice giving. However, all of the measures used in the studies 
were self-reported assessments of wisdom. Participants might have inflated their reported 
wisdom, as it is a highly valued quality. Studies 2, 3, and 4 addressed this possibility by using a 
self-report measure of wise reasoning that is typically free from self-enhancing biases (Brienza et 
al., 2017). Nevertheless, in future work, wise reasoning should be assessed through other 
methods, such as using trained raters to assess how one gives advice or thinks about a problem 
(Grossmann, 2017). 
Another approach is to examine the recipient’s evaluation of that advice. Prior research 
suggests that wise reasoning should lead to sound judgements. For instance, both lay people and 
professionals (e.g., lawyers, clinicians, and clergy) recognize the processes involved in wise 
reasoning as being wise (Bluck & Glück, 2005; Grossmann et al., 2013). However, I did not 
measure what a recipient would think of response of a participant that was reasoning wisely. The 
responses from the present studies were too short for any meaningful coding of wise reasoning, 
but future studies could have participants write a more substantial letter or record a video giving 
56 
 
detailed advice. Trained raters can code these responses for wise reasoning following established 
procedures (Grossmann et al., 2010, 2012) and a new set of participants can rate yoked advice 
responses to assess lay evaluations of the advice. 
 Another important process to examine in more detail is the perspective-taking strategy 
used by advisors. Research on perspective-taking failures suggests that although people may 
want to infer another’s mental state, they do not always use accurate strategies (Eyal, Steffel, & 
Epley, 2018; Hadar & Fischer, 2008; Kray, 2000). For instance, simulating another’s experience 
is more accurate than inferring what another person would do, but people tend to do the latter 
when asked to take the perspective of others (Zhou, Majka, & Epley, 2017). With this in mind, 
advisors might for instance indicate that they considered the perspective of others, when they in 
fact did it in an ineffective way. To address this issue, future studies could use more fine-tuned 
measures to investigate how people tried to understand another person’s situation. In addition, 
researchers could use standardized problems (such as problems on leadership, management, and 
other topics from the Harvard Kennedy School Case Program) with expert-agreed criteria for 
sound decisions.  
Examining a Wider Range of Situations. Concerning the experimental data, Study 2 
examined a variety of situations, as participants could freely recall any kind of social dilemma. 
However, this study is subject to recall effects as people in the advice giving condition could 
have recalled different kinds of dilemmas compared to those in other conditions. To address this 
concern, Studies 3 and 4 used standardized dilemmas. Such standardized scenarios by default 
reduce the ecological generalizability of the phenomena. Both scenarios involved interpersonal 
conflicts between two friends or relatives, asking the decision-maker to choose a side. This kind 
of dilemma was used in prior research (Grossmann et al., 2010), and I modified them to ensure 
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that there were balanced arguments for each side. One drawback of using these dilemmas is that 
they only cover a small subset of the challenging situations people face in life. Future research 
could examine a wider range of problems, such as reconciling incompatible values or goals, 
assigning responsibilities, or resolving a transgression. Researchers could also examine advice 
giving in different fields such as parenting, teaching, professional mentorship, interactions with 
consultants, and doctor-patient relationships. 
Further, I have largely investigated past or hypothetical dilemmas in a lab setting with 
little time pressure and low emotional stakes. It is unclear how advice giving might unfold in the 
middle of an active, heated conflict. Research on intergroup empathy and perspective-taking 
suggests that mentalizing processes can be beneficial when people reason abstractly, but they can 
be ineffective or even counterproductive during concrete interactions (Bruneau & Saxe, 2012; 
Vorauer & Sasaki, 2009). Future studies could ostensibly create conflicts in the lab or invite 
groups of people to discuss ongoing conflicts, with a participant either giving advice or getting 
personally involved. These kinds of studies could help identify the opportune and inopportune 
times to give advice. 
Conclusion 
Advice giving is more than a simple transfer of information, as it is also a way for 
advisors to uncover insights about challenging situations. I found that giving advice can promote 
wise reasoning for the advisor. This shift in wise reasoning not only applies to the specific 
situation which required advice, as advice giving also improves wise reasoning about an 
unrelated situation. Evidence for this effect comes from a wide range of sources – longitudinal 
data and lab experiments where people either recalled past dilemmas or thought about a 
standardized dilemma. The findings from the present investigation strengthen the notion that 
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wisdom is malleable. They also highlight the importance of sharing information with others as a 
means to cultivate one’s personal wisdom. Looking forward, this work paves the way for new 
research investigating how communication processes shape people’s thinking and how advisors 
are impacted by the support they give to others.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Supplementary Analyses for Study 1 
Testing the Models without Low Loading Items 
In Study 1, the items “You like to teach things to people” had relatively lower loadings 
compared to the other wise attitudes items. In addition, the item “In a bad situation it helps to 
find a different way of looking at things” was not conceptually related to the other advice giving 
items, which explicitly mentioned advice. I thus conducted the analyses on the cross-lagged 
panel model without these items. 
The model had good fit, RMSEA = .011, PCLOSE > .999, CFI = .999. In line with the 
findings from the main text, advice giving was cross-sectionally associated with wise attitudes at 
all three time points (see Figure 7). Looking at longitudinal relationships, advice giving 
contributed to wiser attitudes over time across 20 years. This finding is similar to the finding 
reported in the main text. Wise attitudes did not predict greater advice giving over time. This 
result differs from the main text, where wise attitudes at Time 2 predicted greater advice giving 
at Time 3. These findings show a clearer pattern, although I chose to report all three items in the 
main text to cover a wider range of items. In sum, removing the two low-loading items still result 
in a similar pattern of findings compared to those reported in the main text. 
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Figure 7. Cross-lagged panel model of advice-giving tendencies and wisdom-related attitudes 
across three time points (T1, T2, and T3) without low-loading items. Circles represent latent 
variables. Unstandardized estimates and significant errors are shown. The straight arrows 
represent regression paths and the curved arrows represent correlations between the residuals of 
the latent variables. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Appendix B: Wise Reasoning Items for Studies 2, 3, and 4 
As you have been thinking about this conflict, to what extent have you done the following: 
1. Put myself in both parties’ shoes 
2. Thought about the things both parties might have in common 
3. Made an effort to take both parties’ perspective 
4. Took time to consider both parties’ opinions on the matter before coming to a conclusion 
5. Looked for different solutions to the evolving conflict 
6. Considered alternative solutions as I learned about the conflict 
7. Believed the situation could lead to a number of different outcomes 
8. Thought the situations could unfold in many different ways 
9. Double-checked whether my opinion on the situation might be incorrect 
10. Double-checked whether either party’s opinions might be correct 
11. Looked for any extraordinary circumstances before forming my opinion 
12. Behaved as if there may be some information to which I do not have access 
13. Tried my best to find a way to accommodate both parties’ perspectives 
14. Thought it may not have been possible, I searched for solutions that could result in both 
parties being satisfied 
15. Considered first whether a compromise was possible in resolving the situation 
16. Viewed it as very important that the parties resolve the situation 
17. Tried to anticipate how the conflict might be resolved 
18. Wondered what I would think if I were somebody else considering the situation 
19. Tried to see the conflict form the point of view of an uninvolved person 
20. Asked myself what other people might think or feel if they were considering the conflict 
21. Thought about whether an outsider person might have a different opinion from mine 
about the situation 
 
Note: Items are listen in presentation order. 
 
Wise reasoning dimensions: recognition of others’ perspective (items 1-4), recognition of change 
and uncertainty (items 5-8), intellectual humility (items 9-12), search for compromise and 
conflict resolution (items 12-17), and application of an outsider’s vantage point (items 18-21). 
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Appendix C: Supplementary Analyses for Study 2 
Controlling for Time Passed 
 Participants in Study 2 recalled times when they encountered a social dilemma. Those in 
the advice giving condition remembered more recent events (days in the past: M = 20.11, SE = 
3.21) compared to those in the personal dilemma (M = 46.76, SE = 13.50), advice receiving (M = 
133.95, SE = 113.40), and advice receiving conditions (M = 141.46, SE = 106.65). As people are 
more critical of their distant past compared to their more recent past (Wilson & Ross, 2001), 
those in the advice giving condition might have reported wiser reasoning compared to those in 
the other conditions because the advice-giving events were more recent. To rule out this concern, 
I computed residual scores of wise reasoning and the individual dimensions, controlling for how 
long ago the recalled event occurred (in days). 
 Wise Reasoning Composite. This data met the assumption for homogeneity of variance, 
F(3, 410) = 2.08, p  = .103. A planned contrast analysis showed that participants in the advice 
giving condition reported wiser reasoning compared to those from the other three conditions, 
F(1, 412) = 7.00, p = .008, ηp2 = .017 (see Figure 8). Post-hoc Tukey contrasts between each 
revealed that advice giving led to wiser reasoning compared to those who recalled a personal 
dilemma, t(272) p = .012. Overall, these results provide some support for my hypothesis that 
advice giving leads to wiser reasoning compared to reasoning about one’s own or a friend’s 
problem. These results are similar to those in the main text, with the addition of a significant 
contrast between advice giving and personal dilemma conditions. 
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Figure 3. Bar chart of the effect of advice condition on the wise reasoning composite score 
(residuals).  
Individual wisdom dimensions.  Planned contrast analyses showed that participants in 
the advice giving condition scored significantly higher on the recognition of others’ perspectives, 
and search for compromise/conflict resolution dimensions compared to those from other 
conditions, perspective: F(1, 412) = 12.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .030, compromise/resolution: F(1, 
413) = 10.55, p = .001, ηp2 = .025 (see Table 7). Looking at the post-hoc tests between each 
condition, advice giving led to higher ratings compared to the person dilemma condition on the 
recognition of others’ perspectives dimension and the search for compromise/resolution 
dimension, perspectives: t(272) = 3.90, p < .001, compromise/resolution: t(272) = 2.53, p = .056 
(see Table 7). Those in the advice giving condition also reported marginally higher recognition 
of others’ perspectives compared to those in the advice receiving condition, t(290) = 2.46, p = 
.068. In addition, advice giving led to a greater search for compromise/resolution compared to 
non-personal advice, t(275) = 3.19, p = .008. These findings are similar to the ones reported in 
the main text, with some slight differences in the post-hoc test results. There is now a significant 
contrast between advice giving and the personal dilemma conditions for the recognition of 
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others’ perspectives dimension. In addition, there is no longer any contrast between the advice 
giving and personal dilemma conditions for the recognition of change/uncertainty dimension  
With regards to other findings, advice receiving led to higher ratings of intellectual 
humility compared to those in the personal dilemma condition, t(289) = 3.03, p = .014. The 
planned contrast analyses did not show any significant differences for the recognition of 
change/uncertainty, intellectual humility, and the application of an outsider’s vantage point 
dimensions, change/uncertainty: F(1, 412) = 2.69, p = .102, ηp2 = .006, humility: F(2, 412) = 
0.50, p > .275, ηp2 = .001, outsider: F(1, 412) = 2.14, p = .144, ηp2 < .005. None of the other 
contrasts yielded any significant results for these dimensions. These findings are similar to those 
reported in the main text. 
In sum, the findings controlling for time passed were largely similar to those reported in 
the main text. These findings should be interpreted with caution, as across conditions, the means 
and standard errors of the number of days passed varied to a great degree. 
Table 6. Means and Confidence Intervals for the Effect of Condition on Wise Reasoning 
Dimensions (Residuals) 
 Perspectives Change Humility Compromise Outsider 
Advice Giving 0.27 
[0.10, 0.44] 
0.11 
[-0.05, 0.27] 
0.06 
[-0.12, 0.23] 
0.23 
[0.07, 0.40] 
0.12 
[-0.07, 0.32] 
Personal Dilemma -0.24 
[-0.43, -0.05] 
-0.04 
[-0.21, 0.13] 
-0.23 
[-0.72, -0.03] 
-0.08 
[-0.27, 0.10] 
-0.22 
[-0.43, -0.01] 
Non-personal Advice -0.03 
[-0.22, 0.16] 
-0.06 
[-0.23, 0.11] 
-0.04 
[-0.24, 0.15] 
-0.16 
[-0.34, 0.02] 
-0.01 
[-0.22, 0.19] 
Advice Receiving -0.05 
[-0.24, 0.14] 
-0.03 
[-0.20, 0.14] 
0.20 
[0.005, 0.39] 
-0.02 
[-0.20, 0.15] 
0.09 
[-0.12, 0.29] 
Note: Lower and upper 95% confidence intervals are presented within the brackets. 
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Appendix D: Materials for Study 3 
Newspaper Advice Column 
Dear A.: 
I am close friends with a couple I'll call "Angie" and "Gil." I met them shortly after they got 
married, and we became friends very quickly. 
 
The problem is, when Angie gets mad at Gil for whatever reason, she wants me to be mad too. 
She thinks I should take sides, and this makes me uncomfortable because they are both my 
friends. Gil has never asked me to take sides with him. 
 
Angie has gone so far as to request that I ignore any attempts by Gil to contact me if they are 
fighting. (He actually doesn't reach out to me during these fights.) I feel bad for him and like I 
am betraying a friend by agreeing to do as she asks. I don't know how to explain to her that as 
they are both my friends, I would rather be left out of their arguments and not have to choose 
sides. 
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Appendix E: Materials for Study 4 
Newspaper Advice Column 1 
Below is the newspaper article from a "Dear Abby" column: 
I am close friends with a couple: Angie and Gil. I met them shortly after they got married, and 
we became friends very quickly. 
 
The problem is, when Angie gets mad at Gil for whatever reason, she wants me to be mad too. 
She thinks I should take sides, and this makes me uncomfortable because they are both my 
friends. Gil has never asked me to take sides with him. 
 
Angie has gone so far as to request that I ignore any attempts by Gil to contact me if they are 
fighting. (He actually doesn't reach out to me during these fights.) I feel bad for him and like I 
am betraying a friend by agreeing to do as she asks. However, both of them are my good friends. 
 
Newspaper Advice Column 2 
Below is the newspaper article from a "Dear Abby" column: 
I have one sister, whom I will call "Dawn", and one brother, "Curt." Our parents died six years 
ago, within months of each other. Ever since, Dawn has once a year mentioned buying a 
headstone for our parents. I'm all for it, but Dawn is determined to spend a bundle on it, and she 
expects her siblings to help foot the bill. She recently told me she had put $2,000 aside to pay for 
it.  
 
Recently Dawn called to announce that she had gone ahead, selected the design, written the 
epitaph and ordered the headstone. Now she expects Curt and me to pay "our share" back to her. 
She said she went ahead and ordered it on her own because she has been feeling guilty all these 
years that our parents didn't have one. I feel that since Dawn did this all by herself, her siblings 
shouldn't have to pay her anything. But I know that if Curt and I don't pay her back, they'll never 
hear the end of it.  
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Unrelated Dilemma 1 
Imagine that the conflict below is happening to you. 
You are close friends with a couple: Angie and Gil. You met them shortly after they got married, 
and you became friends very quickly. 
 
The problem is, when Angie gets mad at Gil for whatever reason, she wants you to be mad too. 
She thinks you should take sides, and this makes you uncomfortable because they are both your 
friends. Gil has never asked you to take sides with him. 
 
Angie has gone so far as to request that you ignore any attempts by Gil to contact you if they are 
fighting. (He actually doesn't reach out to you during these fights.) You feel bad for him and like 
you are betraying a friend by agreeing to do as she asks. However, both of them are your good 
friends. 
 
Unrelated Dilemma 2 
Imagine that the conflict below is happening to you. 
You have one sister, Dawn, and one brother, Curt. Your parents died six years ago, within 
months of each other. Ever since, Dawn has once a year mentioned buying a headstone for your 
parents. You are all for it, but Dawn is determined to spend a bundle on it, and she expects her 
siblings to help foot the bill. She recently told you she had put $2,000 aside to pay for it.  
 
Recently Dawn called to announce that she had gone ahead, selected the design, written the 
epitaph and ordered the headstone. Now she expects you and Curt to pay "our share" back to her. 
She said she went ahead and ordered it on her own because she has been feeling guilty all these 
years that our parents didn't have one. I feel that since Dawn did this all by herself, her siblings 
shouldn't have to pay her anything. But I know that if you and Curt don't pay her back, you'll 
never hear the end of it.  
